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Introduction
The setting is the Common Market. The protagonist is a gargantuan multinational
firm, incorporated outside the European Community, that has just acquired another
non-EC company. Among the target's assets is an exclusive patent license covering a
process that, although as yet inoperative, may increase the acquirer's already formi-
dable market share in Europe. A competitor - yet another non-EC actor - pro-
tests to the antitrust authorities, claiming abuse under the European equivalent of
the Sherman Act. Our protagonist defends its exclusive license as a legal monopoly
specially exempt from liability under the rules of competition. Who will win?
This Note reports a chain of legal events presenting approximately
this scenario, a story with implications for firms doing business in
Europe well beyond the theme of patent protection.
In July 1988, the Commission of the European Communities held
that Tetra Pak Rausing SA ("Tetra Pak") had contravened EEC competi-
tion law by obtaining an exclusive patent license' when it acquired a firm
that held that license.2 Tetra Pak contended that the licensing agree-
ment was exempt from certain Community rules on account of a "block
exemption" allowed for patent licenses. 4 The Court of First Instance
dismissed Tetra Pak's application for an annulment of the Commission
1. Under an exclusive patent license, the licensor generally agrees to grant no
other licenses and to refrain from manufacture or sale within the licensee's territory;
the licensee acquires the right to sue infringers of the underlying patent. W. R. CoR-
NISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED
RIGHTS 185 (2d ed. 1989).
2. Commission Decision 88/501 of 26July 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (Tetra Pak I (BTG-License)), 1988 OJ. (L 272)
27 [hereinafter Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision].
3. Also known as a "group exemption," a block exemption is a regulation
promulgated by the EC Commission that removes an entire category of agreements
from the confines of Article 85(1), the basic rule prohibiting restraints on competi-
tion. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
4. Commission Regulation 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of Arti-
cle 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 131 (1992)
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Decision in July of 1990 and nullified the exclusive license.5
The Tetra Pak case addressed the legal interaction of the European
Community's two fundamental rules of competition, Article 85 and Arti-
cle 86 of the Treaty of Rome.6 Article 85(1) prohibits all agreements
that prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Mar-
ket.7 Article 85(2) "automatically" voids any contract or license contain-
ing anticompetitive clauses. 8 Article 85(3) empowers the Commission,
however, to exempt entire categories of facially anticompetitive agree-
ments if they enhance "the production or distribution of goods," pro-
mote "technical or economic progress," and benefit consumers. 9 The
second major provision dealing with competition, Article 86, prohibits
any "abuse" by a firm occupying a dominant market position if such
abuse affects trade among Member States.' °
In Tetra Pak, the subject matter of Article 86, namely, abuse of dom-
inant position, overlapped with Article 85(3), exemption from general
proscriptions of anticompetitive behavior. Under Article 86, Tetra Pak
was clearly a "dominant" firm, holding a ninety percent share of the
market affected by the patent. Therefore, the Commission found that
the acquisition of the new exclusive license was an "abuse" of Tetra
Pak's dominant position. On the other hand, because the patent license
indisputedly qualified for an Article 85(3) exemption, the legal issue
arose as to whether Article 86 applied to a license otherwise worthy of
an exemption under Article 85(3).
Even though Tetra Pak focuses on a patent license, the holding has
significance beyond the field of intellectual property. "Block exemp-
tions," the Community's official derogations from its competition law,
exclude categories of agreements encompassing diverse subjects,
including patent licensing,i know-how licensing,' 2 franchising,'5
motor-vehicle distribution and servicing, 14 specialization,15 maritime
0.J. (L 219) 15, revised by Corrigenda, 1985 0J. (L 113) 34 [hereinafter Patent-
Licensing Block Exemption].
5. Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334
(Ct. First Instance 1990).
6. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY],
available in 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Translations of the EEC Treaty or Treaty of Rome vary.
The translation herein comes from the official United Nations Treaty Series.
7. Id. art. 85(1).
8. Id. art. 85(2).
9. Id. art. 85(3).
10. Id. art. 86.
11. Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4.
12. Commission Regulation 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-How Licensing Agreements, 1989
0J. (L 61) 1 [hereinafter Know-how-Licensing Block Exemption].
13. Commission Regulation 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Franchise Agreements, 1988 0J. (L 359)
46 [hereinafter Franchising Block Exemption].
14. Commission Regulation 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle Distribution and
Vol. 25
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transport, 16 and research and development. 17 This Note will demon-
strate that Tetra Pak calls into question the efficacy of any and all block
exemptions held by a firm with market power, for once the firm abuses
its dominant position and activates Article 86, the offending agreement
loses block-exemption protection.1 8
Section I of this Note presents an overview of the Tetra Pak case.
Section II provides background to EC competition law institutions. Sec-
tion III is a compendium of EC competition law, specifically Articles 85
and 86. This Section also reviews the procedure and enforcement
mechanisms of competition law in the EC. Section IV returns to Tetra
Pak and summarizes the process before the Commission and the Court
of First Instance. Finally, Section V explores the implications of the
Tetra Pak holding for future competition in Europe and suggests steps
firms may take to avoid infringing Articles 85 and 86.
I. Background: Parties and Agreements
A. Tetra Pak Rausing SA
Tetra Pak, registered in Switzerland and privately owned, is the world's
largest producer of paper cartons for packaging milk and other
Servicing Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 15) 16 [hereinafter Motor Vehicle Block
Exemption].
15. Commission Regulation 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Specialization Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L
53) 1 [hereinafter Specialization Block Exemption].
16. Council Regulation 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 Laying Down Detailed
Rules for the Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Maritime Transport,
1986 Oj. (L 378) 4 [hereinafter Maritime Transport Regulation].
17. Commission Regulation 418/85 of 19 December 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Research and Development
Agreements, 1985 Oj. (L 53) 5 [hereinafter R&D Block Exemption].
18. The intellectual property right at issue in Tetra Pak was acquired by means of
a merger with a firm holding the exclusive patent license in question. One must
consider, then, what significance this corporate acquisition may have under Articles
85 or 86. The Court ofJustice has held that a merger may infringe Articles 85 and
86. Case 6/72, Europemballage v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 247, 1973
C.M.L.R. 199, 226. In the context of mergers and changes of corporate structure,
the Commission and the Court have explored numerous applications of Article 85,
see generally FRANK L. FINE, MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES IN EUROPE: THE LAW AND
POLICY OF THE EEC 6-28 (1989), and Article 86, see generally id. at 29-39. No compre-
hensive Merger Control Regulation was adopted until 1989. See Council Regulation
4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertak-
ings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 32. See generally Paul D. Callister, Note, The December 1989
European Community Merger Control Regulation: A Non-EC Perspective, 24 CORNELL INT'L
Lj. 97 (1991).
Nonetheless, in Tetra Pak the merger was held to be irrelevant. Tetra Pak's take-
over of Liquipak was no more than the means by which Tetra Pak came into posses-
sion of its exclusive license, a fact to which the Commission "attached no particular
significance." Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 384. Consequently, since it was not at
issue in Tetra Pak, this Note will not consider further the problem of mergers in the
EC.
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liquids. 19 At the time of the Commission decision, Tetra Pak had sub-
sidiaries in all Member States of the EC except Greece and Luxem-
bourg.20 In 1985 its enviable market shares within the Common Market
were 89.1 percent of sterilized cartons sold 21 and 91.8 percent of steril-
ized packaging machines leased or sold and still operating.2 2
Tetra Pak's packaging method originally involved sterilizing contin-
uous rolls of material before it was shaped into containers. 23
B. The Patent License
The British Technology Group (BTG)24 , meanwhile, acquired a patent
for a process employing ultraviolet light to enhance the sterilizing
properties of hydrogen peroxide. 25 Because BTG's new process would
allow the efficient sterilization of pre-formed containers, it was poten-
tially a significant advance in ultra-high temperature (UHT) packaging.
In 1981, BTG's predecessor granted patent and know-how
licenses2 6 for its ultraviolet/hydrogen peroxide process to a subsidiary
of the Liquipak Group, which in 1983 assigned the licenses to Liquipak
International BV ("Liquipak Int'l").2 7 Subsequently, Liquipak Int'l
entered into an arrangement with a Norwegian group called Elopak,
which planned to enter the aseptic packaging market. 28 By 1986, with
the assistance of Elopak, Liquipak Int'l had created a new filling machine
that utilized the BTG process, although it had yet to be "tested in
practice."'2 9
In 1986, Tetra Pak acquired three Liquipak companies, including
Liquipak Int'l.30 BTG did not object to transferring the exclusive
19. Tetra Pak's sales for 1990, in 109 countries, were projected at 60 billion car-
tons, with revenues of $5 billion. Peter Fuhrman, Boxed In, FORBES, Oct. 29, 1990, at
102. A basis of success for this international concern is a patented container, made
from paper, plastic, and aluminum, with the capacity for keeping out air during the
filling process. Id. In addition, Tetra Pak manufactures and distributes the machin-
ery used in filling its cartons, and Tetra Pak was one of the first developers of machin-
ery used in filling "aseptic" (sterilized) liquid food containers. Tetra Pak Comm 'n
Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 27.
20. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 O.J. (L 272) at 28.
21. Id. at 45, Table 1.
22. Id. at 46, Table 2.
23. Id. at 30.
24. "BTG is a self-financing public undertaking whose main task.., is licensing
for commercial exploitation the results of public research in industry in the United
Kingdom and elsewhere." Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 30.
26. A "know-how license" covers "additional information" and "incidental tricks
that help in putting [an] invention to best use." CORNISH, supra note 1, at 186.
27. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 28.
Liquipak Int'l was a Netherlands corporation. Before Tetra Pak's acquisition of the
companies in 1986, Liquipak was owned by the Allpak group (Canada) and by a pri-
vate individual. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 377. Liquipak "specializes in the
development and manufacture of filling equipment for liquid food products." Id.
28. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 31.
29. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 378.
30. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 28.
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licenses to Tetra Pak and announced that it would negotiate to extend
the exclusive licenses after their expiration in 1988.31 As a result of
Tetra Pak's takeover, however, Elopak ended its collaboration with
Liquipak,3 2 and made a complaint to the Commission in June 1986,33
alleging that Tetra Pak had infringed Articles 85 and 86.34
C. EC Commission Decision
The Commission held that Tetra Pak had violated EEC competition law
because, as a result of the exclusive license, Tetra Pak had prevented
Elopak and other potential competitors from entering the market for
aseptic packaging, thereby unduly strengthening its own position in the
market,3 5 an abuse of dominant position in violation of Article 86. Fur-
ther, in conjunction with BTG, Tetra Pak had infringed Article 85(1) in
such a way that the BTG-Tetra Pak agreement was not exempt under
Article 85(3).36 Although the Commission did not fine Tetra Pak
because its "contraventions of the rules of competition were relatively
novel," T3 7 it forced Tetra Pak to relinquish its exclusivity, even though
BTG would have preferred to issue only an exclusive license.3 8
Hence, the issue was joined. Would a company found to have
abused its dominant position merely by acquiring an exclusive patent
license relinquish the privileges of its block exemption, and would the
exclusive license be rendered void? The Court answered in the
affirmative.
H. EEC Competition Law and Community Institutions3 9
To aid in evaluating the impact of the Tetra Pak judgment upon large
firms doing business in Europe, this Section will briefly look at EEC
legal structures. This review will include the Council, the Commission,
and the Community's courts, which enforce the commands of EEC law
found in the Treaty of Rome and its ancillary legislation.
The foundation of all EEC law is the Treaty of Rome, the constitu-
tive document of the Community, which now consists of twelve Member
31. Id. at 29.
32. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 378.
33. Id. at 379.
34. Id. Elopak filed its application pursuant to Council Regulation 17 of 6 Febru-
ary 1962, 1959-1962 OJ. English Spec. Ed. (L 13) 87, 204 [hereinafter Regulation
17], the implementing legislation of Articles 85 and 86. The Commission may, upon
application by "natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest," id. art.
3(2)(b), require an agreement infringing Articles 85 or 86 to be terminated. Id. art.
3(1).
35. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 33.
36. Id. at 43. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
37. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 Q.J. (L 272) at 43.
38. Id. at 43-44.
39. See generally T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 8-48 (2d ed. 1988).
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States.40 The Single European Act of 198741 amended the Treaty,
which had originally called for the establishment of a "Common Mar-
ket." 4 2 Designed to "eliminat[e] ... quantitative restrictions in regard
to the importation and exportation of goods4 3 .... [and] aboli[sh] ...
obstacles for the free movement of persons, services and capital ... -44
the Single European Act set December 31, 1992, as the deadline for the
establishment of an "internal market."
A. The EC Commission and the Council
All EEC legislation results from the interaction of the Commission and
the Council. The Treaty delegates exclusive authority to adopt legisla-
tion to the Council, which is made up of one minister representing each
Member State.45 Generally, the Commission, a professional civil service
described as the "guardian of the Treaty," 4 6 possesses sole power to
propose legislation. 4 7 The department of the Commission that deals with
competition matters and enforces Articles 85 and 86 is the Directorate
General IV, known as "DG IV. ' '4 8 The head of DG IV is called the
Director General. 49 Final Decisions must be approved by the full seven-
teen-member Commission.5 0
Article 189 of the Treaty empowers the Council and Commission to
issue "Regulations," which are binding law within the Member States.5 '
Regulations embody a great deal of the Community's competition law.
The Commission also releases its findings in individual competition
cases in the form of "Decisions," which, while clearly adjudicatory in
40. Member States are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
JOSEPHINE STEINER, TExTBOOK ON EEC LAW 3-4 (1988).
EEC law is applicable within the territory of Member States and apparently on the
continental shelf of Member States, as well as in Monaco, San Marino, Andorra,
Gibraltar, the Canary Islands, Centa and Melilla, and the French Overseas Depart-
ments. It is not applicable in the Isle of Man, Channel Islands, or in the Sovereign
Base Areas in Cypress. Chris Clerides, An Outline of Competition Law and Practice in the
EEC, 21 CYPRUS L. REV. 3314-15 (1988).
41. Single European Act, signed at Luxembourg on 17 February 1986 and at The Hague
on 28 February 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1.
42. EEC TREATY art. 2.
43. Id. art. 3(a).
44. Id. art. 3(c).
45. Id. arts. 145-46.
46. ALAN CAMPBELL, EC COMPETITION LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S TExTBOoK 3
(1980).
47. EEC TREATY art. 155. The EC Commission consists of seventeen individuals
appointed by the governments of the Member States. The members of the Commis-
sion do not, however, act as representatives of their respective countries, nor do they
take instructions from their home governments. They owe allegiance to the Commu-
nity. HARTLEY, supra note 39, at 8-9.
48. VALENTINE KoRAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 152 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter EEC COMPETITION LAw].
49. Id.
50. Id. at 155.
51. EEC TREATY art. 189.
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nature, are referred to as "legislation" within the Community.5 2 Under
Article 189, a Commission Decision is binding upon any party (or Mem-
ber State) to whom it is addressed. 5 3
B. The Court ofJustice and Court of First Instance
The Treaty created the Court ofJustice of the European Communities 54
(ECJ). In 1989, the Council transferred jurisdiction over actions relat-
ing to the EEC rules of competition to the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities (CFI).5 5 The legal authority for the CFI rests
directly upon Article 168a of the Treaty of Rome, one of the amend-
ments introduced by the Single European Act in 1987.56 Unsuccessful
parties, interveners who are directly affected, Member States, and Com-
munity institutions may appeal "final decisions" of the CFI to the Court
ofJustice,5 7 provided such appeal is initiated within two months of noti-
fication of the decision.58
C. The Advocate General
The post of Advocate General is another important institution of EC
52. Another EC organ, the Assembly or European Parliament, has attained addi-
tional status since the enactment of the Single European Act, supra note 41, which
bestows upon it the right to advise the Council and Commission on EC legislation. 2
BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL AIrrrRUsT: A
COMPARATIVE GUIDE 5 (2d ed. 1990). The assembly plays a consultative role in
reviewing the Commission's annual reports on competition policy. D. G. GOYDER,
EEC COMPETrrION LAw 431 (1988).
53. EEC TREATY art. 189.
54. Id. arts. 4, 164-68.
The plural "communities" refers to the European Economic Community, the
European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community.
See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC
TREATY], available in 261 U.N.T.S. 140; and TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY], available in, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
The institutions of the three Treaties now function as a unitary entity. HARTLEY,
supra note 39, at 92.
55. Council Decision 88/591 Establishing a Court of First Instance of the Euro-
pean Communities, 1989 O.J. (C 215) 1, revised by Corrigenda, 1989 0J. (L 241) 4.
[hereinafter Decision Establishing CFI].
The Court of First Instance consists of twelve judges. Id. art. 2(1). They are
appointed "by common accord of the Governments of the Member States." EEC
TREATY, supra note 6, art. 168a(3) (as amended 1987). Although the Court of First
Instance is "attached" to the Court ofJustice, the former was conceived as a "com-
pletely independent judicial body." 0l Du6, The Court of First Instance, in YEARBOOK
OF EUROPEAN LAW 1988 1, 9 (1989).
56. Single European Act, supra note 41, at art. 11.
57. Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic
Community (as amended by art. 7 of Council Decision establishing the CFI, supra
note 55) art. 49 [hereinafter ECJ Protocol].
58. Id. Appeals are allowed only on three grounds: [i] "lack of competence of
the Court of First Instance, [ii] a breach of procedure... which adversely affects the
interests of the appellant as well as [iii] the infringement of Community law by the
Court of First Instance." Id. art. 51. In the event of a successful appeal, "the Court
ofJustice shall quash the decision of the Court of First Instance." Id. art. 54.
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legal practice. 59 The Court of First Instance may appoint one of its
member judges to the position of Advocate General. 60 An Advocate
General must act "with complete impartiality and independence, to
make, in open court, reasoned submissions on certain cases brought
before the Court of First Instance in order to assist the Court... in the
performance of its task." 6 1 An Advocate General is a spokesman or
spokeswoman solely for the public interest and represents neither the
European Community nor any constituent Member State.62
The "Opinion" of the Advocate General, usually delivered at a sep-
arate hearing of the Court, may set out facts, expound the law, and com-
ment on other legal matters. 6 3 Opinions are not limited to points
argued by the parties, for the Advocate General may "put forward an
original solution, which had not occurred to the parties . . . ."64 EC
Courts commonly cite Opinions delivered by Advocates General. 65
I. The Structure of EEC Competition Law6 6
EEC competition law is encapsulated in Articles 85 and 86, which take
priority over national legislation. 67 The Court ofJustice has stated that
because Articles 85(1) and 86 "tend by their very nature to produce
direct effects in relations between individuals, these Articles create
59. Courts in Common Law countries have no equivalent office, although the
Advocate General has been compared to the commissaire de gouvernement in the French
Conseil d'Etat. HARTLEY, supra note 39, at 52.
60. Decision Establishing CFI, supra note 55, art. 2(3).
61. Id.
62. HARTLEY, supra note 39, at 52.
63. L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS G.JACOBS, THE COURT OFJUSTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 55 (1983).
64. HARTLEY, supra note 39, at 54.
65. BROWN &JACOBS, supra note 63, at 59.
66. As a consideration of the relationship between antitrust law in the United
States and competition law in the EEC is not within the scope of this Note, this
discussion will confine itself solely to the realm of EC law. For comparisons of the
two approaches, see generally HAWK, supra note 52; Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization
and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and
Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981 (1986); Barry E. Hawk, International Antitrust
Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201
(1982).
67. Although the Treaty never expressly states that its provisions are directly
applicable law, the ECJ has held that, because Members States have relinquished to
some degree their sovereignty within a "new legal order," Community law is directly
effective within their municipal legal systems. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport
en Expeditie Orderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] 1 C.M.L.R. 105. See also Case C-213/89, Regina
v. Factorame, Ltd., [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (reaffirming Van Gend en Loos in regard to
direct effect of Treaty); Cases 106-120/87, Asteris AE v. Greece, 1988 E.C.R. 5515,
[1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 575 (Community law creates individual rights that national courts
must protect); Case 190/87, Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Borken v. Handelson-
derneming Moormann BV, 1988 E.C.R. 4689, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 656 (Community
law is independent of the legislation of Member States).
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direct rights ... which the national courts must safeguard." '68 National
authorities, then, create a "procedural and administrative framework"
within which the rules of competition are to be applied. 6 9 Thus it is
clear that Articles 85 and 86 are directly applicable law within Member
States, and, further, that they create direct effects within national legal
systems.70 Competition law must therefore be viewed as Community-
wide legislation.
Secondary legislation emitted by the Council and Commission is
equally binding, for Article 189 of the Treaty explicitly states that a Reg-
ulation is "binding in every respect and directly applicable in each Mem-
ber State," 7 1 and, further, a Council or Commission Decision is
"binding in every respect for the addressees named therein."'7 2 Rulings
of the Court are binding as regards the case in question, including an
annulment action arising under Article 173, which allows an individual
to appeal an act of the Council or Commission. 73 Article 5 requires
Member States, moreover, to "[ensure] the carrying out of the obliga-
tions ... resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Community." 74
A. Article 85
Article 85 is directed against anticompetitive agreements. 7 5 Article
85(1) prohibits "any agreements between enterprises, 76 any decisions
68. Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. 51, 62,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238, 271. See also Case 75/84, Metro SB-Grossmirkte GmbH &
Co. KG v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 3021, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 118 (Article 85(1)
directly applicable law, creating rights between individuals enforceable in civil
courts);Joined Cases 209-213/84, Minist~re public v. Lucas Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425,
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 173 (national courts may rule on compatibility of an agreement
with competition rules, which have direct effect). This position has recently been
solidly reaffirmed. Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung
unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV, 1989 E.C.R. 838, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102.
69. Lucas Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. at 1427 (A.G. Opinion); see also Asteris v. Greece, 1988
E.C.R. 5515, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 575.
70. "The Court ofJustice ... tend[s] to use the two concepts of direct applicabil-
ity and direct effects interchangeably." STEINER, supra note 40, at 18.
71. EEC TREATY art. 189.
72. Id.
73. Id. art 173.
74. Id. art. 5.
75. Id. art. 85. See generally BOAZ BARACK, THE APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION
RULES (ANTITRUST LAw) OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TO ENTERPRISES
AND ARRANGEMENTS EXTERNAL TO THE COMMON MARKET 122-44 (1981); C. W. BEL-
LAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 45-129 (3d ed.
1987); CAMPBELL, supra note 46, at 23-29; ALFRED GLEIss, COMMON MARKET CARTEL
LAw 34-311 (2d ed. 1981); GOYDER, supra note 52, at 71-252; 2 HAWK, supra note 52,
at 1-145; RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 165-210 (1985).
76. For the sake of consistency, this Note relies on the United Nations Treaty
Series text, which translates the French entreprise and German Unternehmen as "enter-
prise." Commentators on EEC law more commonly employ the alternative transla-
tion, "undertaking." The words "enterprise" and "undertaking" are broadly
applicable to "almost any legal or natural person carrying on activities of an eco-
nomic nature, or hav[ing] a reasonable degree of economic autonomy," including
corporations, unincorporated associations, partnerships, and individual traders.
BARACK, supra note 75, at 40-41. See, e.g., Commission Decision 89/205 of 21 Decem-
Cornell International Law Journal
by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are
likely to affect trade between the Member States and which have as their
object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market.. ."77 Article 85(2) provides that "[a]ny
agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null
and void."' 78 Article 85(3), however, empowers the Commission to carve
out exceptions to Article 85(1) by declaring the latter "inapplicable" to
agreements that "contribute [i] to the improvement of the production or
distribution of goods or [ii] to the promotion of technical or economic
progress [iii] while reserving to users an equitable share in the profit
resulting therefrom .... ,,79 Yet the Commission's authority to create
exceptions to Article 85(1) is conditional, for an agreement cannot qual-
ify for exemption if it will either [i] "impose on the enterprises con-
cerned any restrictions not indispensable to the attainment of [EEC
competition policy] objectives," 80 or [ii] afford such enterprises the pos-
sibility of "[eliminating] competition in respect of a substantial propor-
tion of the goals concerned." 8 1
1. Individual Exemption and Block Exemption
In 1962 the Council adopted Council Regulation 17,82 which legisla-
tively brings Articles 85 and 86 into force, and which enables the Com-
mission to grant individual exemptions to qualified agreements, 83 provided
the parties have "notified" their agreements to the Commission. 8 4
Three years later, the Council expanded the Commission's exempting
powers by promulgating Regulation 19/65,85 which enables the Com-
mission, by means of regulations, to exempt certain categories of agree-
ber 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Magill TV
Guide/ITP, BBC, & RTE), 1989 0. J. (L 78) 43, 47 [hereinafter Magill TV Guide]
(three broadcasting systems were undertakings within the meaning of Article 86
merely because they were "each engaged in economic activity").
77. EEC TREATY art. 85(1). Art. 85(l) includes a non-exhaustive list of particular
infractions forbidden by the Article. Id. art. 85(l)(a-e).
78. Id. art. 85(2) (emphasis added).
79. Id. art. 85(3).
80. Id. art. 85(3)(a).
81. Id. art. 85(3)(b).
82. Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 3(1). "Where the Commission, upon appli-
cation or upon its own initiative, finds that there is infringement of Article 85 or
Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by decision require the undertakings or associations
of undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end." Id.
83. Id. art. 9(1). "Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice, the
Commission shall have sole power to declare Article 85(1) inapplicable pursuant to
Article 85(3) of the Treaty." Id. (emphasis added). Such review is now under the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text.
84. Regulation 17, supra note 34, arts. 4(1), 5(1). Under EEC procedure, "to
notify" means officially to inform the Commission of the contents of an agreement.
85. Council Regulation 19/65 of 2 March 1965 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices,
1965-1966 O.J. 35 [hereinafter Regulation 19/65].
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ments and concerted practices from the restrictions of Article 85(1).86
The Council's action was the inauguration of block exemption, and the
Commission has periodically formulated new exemptions for categories
of agreements.87
2. The Patent-Licensing Block Exemption
Among the exemptions devised in the wake of Regulation 19/6588 was
the Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, addressing patent-licensing
agreements as well as agreements combining the licensing of patents
and the communication of know-how. 89 Under this Regulation, BTG's
exclusive licensing agreement with Tetra Pak qualified for exemption.
Article 1 of the Patent-Licensing Block Exemption exempts certain
types of patent agreements from the provisions of Article 85(1). In Arti-
cle 3, as is typical with other block exemptions, a "black list" specifies
types of patent agreements that remain expressly forbidden. Somewhat
retronymically, the list of agreements not infringing EEC law is referred
to as the "white list," set down in Article 2. Article 4 sets up the "oppo-
sition procedure," under which a firm notifying an agreement to the
Commission, and hearing no objections within six months, may enjoy an
exemption-by-default from Article 85(1).90
The patent-licensing exemption reflects the Commission's experi-
ence with thousands of applications and notifications. The Commission
makes it clear, however, that certain kinds of agreements, including pat-
ent pools, joint ventures, reciprocal licensing, and plant breeder's
rights, are not included within the block exemption because "experience
so far acquired is inadequate" to warrant their exemption. 9 1 Article 5
omits these types of agreements from the categorical exemption for pat-
ent licenses. 92
86. Id. art. 1.
87. See Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4; Know-how-Licensing
Block Exemption, supra note 12; Franchising Block Exemption, supra note 13; Motor
Vehicle Block Exemption, supra note 14; Specialization Block Exemption, supra note
15; Maritime Transport Regulation, supra note 16; R&D Block Exemption, supra note
17; Commission Regulation 1983/83 of 22June 1983 on Application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 1983 OJ. (L 173)
1 (as corrected)[hereinafter Exclusive-Distribution Block Exemption]; Commission
Regulation 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 OJ. (L 173) 5 (as corrected)
[hereinafter Exclusive-Purchasing Block Exemption].
88. "[T]he Commission may ... declare that Article 85(1) [of the Treaty] shall
not apply to categories of agreements ... which include restrictions imposed in rela-
tion to the acquisition or use of industrial property rights-in particular of patents,
utility models, designs or trademarks . . ." Regulation 19/65, supra note 85, art. 1.
89. Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, art. I(1).
90. See infra notes 345-64 and accompanying text.
91. Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, Recital 8.
92. Id. art. 5.
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3. Commission's Power to Withdraw Exemption
Any and every release from the requirements of Article 85(1), whether
via a Regulation 17 individual exemption or a Regulation 19/65 block
exemption, will be at the solitary volition of the Commission, 93 for not
even the Council or Court of Justice may create an exemption.9 4 More-
over, the EEC's secondary legislation provides for the rescission of
exemptions at any time.9 5 Accordingly, the Patent-Licensing Exemption
allows the Commission to withdraw block exemption
where it finds in a particular case that an agreement exempted by this
Regulation nevertheless has certain effects which are incompatible with
the conditions laid down in Article 85(3) of the Treaty, and in particular
where9 6 . . . the licensed products or the services provided using a
licensed process are not exposed to effective competition in the licensed
territory .... 97
As one might expect, the Commission remains vigilant over what it has
bestowed.
This description of the Commission's power to end exemption com-
pletes the brief overview of Article 85, the first skein of EEC competition
law. The parties to Tetra Pak before the Court of First Instance had to
contend with the intertwining of the Patent-Licensing Block Exemption
with the second major skein of EEC competition law, Article 86, the pro-
vision that deals with the abuse of dominant position.
B. Article 8698
The Tetra Pak case centers around the Commission's Decision that Tetra
Pak specifically infringed Article 86 upon procurement of an exclusive
patent license by means of its acquisition of Liquipak Int'l.99 Article 86
provides that "[a]ny abuse ... of a dominant position within the Common
Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between Mem-
ber States."' t
1. Dominant Position
EEC authorities commonly define market dominance as a situation in
which an undertaking enjoys a position of economic strength affording it
the power to "act without paying attention to rivals, suppliers or pur-
93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
95. Regulation 19/65, supra note 85, art. 7.
96. Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, art. 9.
97. Id. art. 9(2).
98. EEC TREATY art. 86. See generally BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 75, at 388-429;
CAMPBELL, supra note 46, at 29-36; GLEISS, supra note 75, at 312-75; GOYDER, supra
note 52, at 296-325; 2 HAWK, supra note 52, at 739-907; WHIsH, supra note 75, at 211-
40.
99. Tetra Pak Comm n Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 28.
100. EEC TREATY art. 86 (emphasis added).
Vol 25
1992 E.E.C. Competition Law
chasers."' 01 The Commission has pointed out, however, that an enter-
prise need not achieve "absolute domination," for it will suffice if it can
count on overall "global independence of conduct .... 102 The ECJ
has warned that even the existence of discernible competition will not
preclude a finding that a single firm is dominant. 10 3
a. Relevant Product Market: Demand and Supply Substitution
Indisputably, a market-dominant firm must hold sway in a specified mar-
ket, and accurate definition of the relevant market is crucial.10 4
(1). Demand Substitution
In order to define this market, the Commission typically looks at the
possibility of both "demand substitution" and "supply substitution."
Demand substitution refers to the ability of consumers to find "perfect
substitutes"' 0 5 for a product. When an undertaking's product is "non-
perfectly substitutable,"' 0 6 consumer demand will not be highly depen-
dent upon the price of alternative items. 10 7 In United Brands,'0 8 for
example, the Court confined the relevant market to bananas, because it
considered bananas an imperfect substitute for oranges or apples. 10 9
An increase in the price of bananas, for example, would not prompt con-
sumers to switch to apples, as the two fruits are not interchangeable.
Recent cases before the Commission argue for the continuing viability
101. Commission Decision 72/21 of 9 December 1971 Relating to an Application
Procedure of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Continental Can Co.), 1972J.O. (L 7) 25,
1972 C.M.L.R. D1I (English text available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Comdec File)
[hereinafter Continental Can Comm'n Decision].
See also Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3
C.M.L.R. 211; accord Case 31/80, NV L'Oreal v. PVBA de Nieuwe AMCK, 1980
E.C.R. 3775, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235; Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission,
1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 83.
102. Continental Can Comm'n Decision, 1972 J.O. (L 7) 25, 1972 C.M.L.R. DlI (Eng-
lish text available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Comdec file). See also Hoffmann-LaRoche,
1979 E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
103. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 283, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 490.
104. Case 6/72, Europemballage v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 247, 1973
C.M.L.R. 199, 226.
105. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 O.J. (L 272) at 36.
106. Id.
107. Id. See also Joined Cases 43 & 63/82, Vereniging ter Bevordering van het
Vlaamse Boekwezen v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 19, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 27 (each
book published constitutes a market in itself because price and elasticity of books is
minimal); Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869, [1979]
3 C.M.L.R. 345 (spare parts of manufacturer constitute single market because no
goods substitutable). See also Commission Decision 89/22 of 5 December 1988 Relat-
ing to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (BPB Industries plc), 1990
O.J. (L 10) 50 (standard and specialty plasterboard form single market because they
exhibit large degree of substitutability); Commission Decision 87/500 of 29 July
1987 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (BBI/Boosey &
Hawkes), 1987 O.J. (L 286) 36 (no substitutes for background brass instruments,
unlike foregoing brass instruments).
108. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429.
109. Id., 1978 E.C.R. at 272, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 482-83.
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of this approach to market definition."t 0
(2). Supply Substitution
On the supply side, the Commission looks at prospects of substitution
from the producer's standpoint. For example, in Continental Can, the
ECJ asked how easily the makers of cylindrical cans could begin making
the varying shapes customary for canned meat and fish. I' In a similar
fashion, the Commission in Tetra Pak looked at various alternatives for
milk packaging (glass bottles, plastic bags, plastic bottles, and cartons)
and found that competing suppliers could not readily convert their out-
put without onerous investment in new equipment and know-how." 12
Thus the Commission concluded that the relevant market was solely the
market for UHT packaged milk, as opposed to the general milk market
or beverage market, because in order to package UHT milk, a producer
could switch to aseptic packaging only through burdensome investment
in new technology. In sum, there was little prospect of supply
substitution.
b. Relevant Geographic Market
As part of its analysis of dominant market position vel non, the Court and
Commission must define the geographic market, the area where "the
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous for the effect of
the economic power of the undertaking concerned to be able to be eval-
uated.""13 An important criterion for determining the relevant geo-
graphic market is that the area present no economic barriers to sales.' 14
The Commission looks at the facts of a given case to find the neces-
sary geographic homogeneity to demarcate the relevant market. For
example, the Commission determined that the relevant geographic mar-
ket for a firm's transmission of navigation signals was the territory in
110. See, e.g., Magill TV Guide, 1988 OJ. (L 78) 43. (weekly TV guides sold to con-
sumers constituted a relevant market distinct from daily listings printed in newspa-
pers because daily listings only substitutable to a limited extent for advance listings);
Commission Decision 88/469 of 20 July 1988 (IVECO/Ford), 1988 OJ. (L 230) 39(heavy vehicles of a greater or lesser gross weight must be taken into account in so far
as they are regarded by customers as substitute products); Commission Decision 89/
113 of 21 December 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty (Decca Navigator System), 1990 OJ. (L 43) 27 [hereinafter Decca Naviga-
tar System] (navigation signal not interchangeable with other transmissions consti-
tuted a separate service market).
111. Case 6/72, Europemballage v. Commission, 1973 ECR 215, 238-40, 1973
C.M.L.R. 199, 227. See also Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie
Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282 (supply of tires is
elastic because different sizes may be manufactured in identical plant).
112. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 37.
113. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 270, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 481.
114. See, e.g., Commission Decision 88/138 of 22 December 1987 Treaty (Eurofix-
Bauco v. Hilti), 1988 OJ. (L 65) 19, 31 (relevant geographic market for nail guns was
the entire Common Market due to absence of any artificial barriers, and products
could be transported throughout the EC without excessive costs).
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which the signals could be received. 115 On the other hand, the geo-
graphic market for the receiver sets sold by the same firm was the entire
Common Market because the receivers could be sold in all Member
States,' 16 and competitors confronted one another on more or less
equal terms throughout the EC.117
c. "Substantial Part of the Common Market"
Because the text of Article 86 refers somewhat vaguely to "a substantial
part of the Common Market," the Court ofJustice has clarified this lan-
guage. The Court has held that domination need not extend beyond the
area of a market consisting of two or more Member States." 18 It is also
clear that the territory of either a large or middle-sized State will consti-
tute a substantial part of the Common Market." 9
In the view of the ECJ, findings relating to actual territory of a mar-
ket are less determinative than a "quantitative assessment" of the mar-
ket's economic importance within the Common Market as a whole.1 20
Thus the Commission was able to find, for example, that an undertaking
whose navigational transmissions were available in certain offshore
waters was operating in a "substantial part of the Common Market"
within the meaning of Article 86 because it was the only navigational sig-
nal available in the area. 12 1 The Community's approach to the defini-
tion of relevant market is well summarized in the recent Sabena case, in
which the Commission referred to the "relevant market" as "all substi-
tute products existing in a given geographic area in which the conditions
of competition are sufficiently uniform to enable the economic power of
the undertakings in question to be judged."'12 2
d. Effect on Trade within the Common Market
One element of an infringement of Article 86 is that an abuse of domi-
115. Decca Navigator Systems, 1989 OJ. (L 43) at 40.
116. Id.
117. Id. See also Magill TV Guide, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43 (geographic market for TV
guides is area in which broadcasts are received).
118. See BRT v. SABAM, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 276-77 (A.G. Opinion).
119. Commission Decision 88/589 of 4 November 1988 Relating to a Proceeding
under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (London European-Sabena), 1988 O.J. (L 317)
47. See also Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung
unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV, 1989 E.C.R. 838, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 102 (medium-sized
states are substantial part of Common Market; flights starting from Germany consti-
tute substantial part of Common Market).
120. See BRT v. SABAM, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238, 277 (A.G. Opinion). "For this
purpose, one must consider above all the density of population, the level of its
resources, and the extent of its purchasing power." Id. See also Ahmed Saeed, 1990
E.C.R. 838, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102 (discussion of quantitative criteria for determin-
ing substantial part of the Common Market). But see Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson v.
Pompes Funebres des Regions Liberees SA, 1988 E.C.R. 2479, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R.
984 (irrelevant whether market is substantial according to the volume of business).
121. Decca Navigator Systems, 1990 OJ. (L 43) at 40.
122. Sabena, 1988 O.J. (L 317) at 43.
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nant position must "affect trade between Member States."' 23 The
Court of Justice has articulated an often-cited standard for affecting
trade:
For this requirement to be fulfilled it must be possible to foresee with a
sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of
law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct
or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member
States.124
The ECJ has further held that specific effects need not be shown so long
as an undertaking's conduct may potentially affect trade within the Com-
mon Market. 125 Although the test of "affecting trade" is relatively easy
to pass, a complainant must show that the challenged agreements will
have some consequence in international trade. Therefore, agreements
that are played out solely in one State will generally not be found to
affect trade. 126 In practice, however, any showing that a firm has traded
its products across national boundaries will fulfill the Article 86 require-
ment of affecting trade. 12 7
e. Market Share
The Court of Justice has stressed that a chief factor tending to show
dominant position is a large share of the relevant market over a period
of time, because "by virtue of that share [an enterprise is] in a position
of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner [having
secured the] freedom of action which is the special feature of a dominant
position."'128 The Court ofJustice has created fairly clear guidelines for
analyzing absolute market share. In Hoffman-LaRoche, the Court indi-
cated that market-share percentages of seventy-five to eighty percent
over three years are "so large that they are in themselves evidence of a
dominant position."' 29 Further, an absolute market share of sixty-three
to sixty-six percent over three years would be "evidence of the existence
123. EEC TREATY art. 86.
124. Case 56/65, Soci6t6 Technique Mini&re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966
E.C.R. 235, 249, 1966 C.M.L.R. 357, 375 (English text available in LEXIS, Eurcom
Library, Cases File)). Accord Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q pci,
[1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337; Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer eV v. Commission,
[1987] 1 E.C.R. 405, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 264; Case 42/84, Remia BV v. Commission,
1985 E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1; Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique Diffusion
Frangaise v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 1825, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 221.
125. Case 226/84, British Leyland v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 3263, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 185.
126. Case 395/87, Minist~re Public v. Tournier, 11 July 1989 (available in LEXIS,
Eurcom Library, Cases File) (a purely national cartel will not affect trade within EC
unless market share of members is extremely large); Case 22/78, Hugin Kassare-
gister v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869, 1920, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345, 373 (activities
confined to London and 50-mile radius do not affect trade between Member States).
127. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 75, at 109. But see infra notes 305-12 and accom-
panying text regarding a de minimis exception.
128. Case 85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 521, [1979]
3 C.M.L.R. 211, 275.
129. Id., 1979 E.C.R. at 527, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 280.
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of a dominant position."' 30
In making its determination, the Court also looks at relative market
shares and examines the "gap" between the alleged dominant market
share and the share held by competitors. Thus, in Hoffman-LaRoche the
Court considered the gap between the dominant firm's sixty-five percent
share and its next competitors' respective 14.8% and 6.3% shares as
evidence of market dominance.13 ' In a "narrow oligopolistic market,"
even a share of forty-seven percent, as against competitors's respective
shares of twenty-seven percent, eighteen percent, seven percent, and
one percent "proves that [an undertaking] is entirely free to decide what
attitude to adopt when confronted by competition."' 13 2
In its Tenth Report on Competition Policy (1981), the Commission noted
that even a twenty to forty percent share of market could be consistent
with market dominance, 13 3 but usually would fall short of proving mar-
ket power. Generally, a firm with a market share of less than five percent
will be presumed incapable of posing an appreciable detriment to com-
petition,' 34 but other factors may nevertheless cause a firm with a
smaller market position to fall under Article 85(1).
f. Other Indicators of Dominance
Even when a corporation lacks a hefty market share, Community author-
ities will examine its competitive position. The Court ofiustice has held
that market dominance can be inferred from a number of factors, none
of which, if considered separately, would be necessarily determina-
tive. 135 Thus, the Commission and Court may be receptive to competi-
tors' complaints regarding "insuperable" obstacles, both practical and
financial. ' 3 6
Among the numerous components that may reinforce a dominant
position are national legislation, 13 7 government licensing and planning
regulations, statutory monopoly power, and protectionist laws shielding
130. Id., 1979 E.C.R. at 530, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 282.
131. Id. See also Case 322/81, NV Nederlandische Banden Industrie Michelin v.
Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3509, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 326 (57-65%b share of
the heavy-vehicle replacement tire market calculated against competitors' respective
shares of four to eight percent is "valid indication of... preponderant strength").
132. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 1979 E.C.R. at 525, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 278.
133. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TENm REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 150 (1980),
referring to EUROPEAN COMMISSION, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 22
(1979).
134. See Case 19/77, Miller Int'l Schallplatten GmbH v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R.
131, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 334; Case 107/82, AEG v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3151,
[1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 413. See also infra notes 305-12 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, 1979 E.C.R. at 520, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 274-75.
136. See, e.g., Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 284,
[1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 491.
137. WHIsH, supra note 75, at 225. For example, a dominant firm's patent may
prevent foreign competitors from entering a national market until the patent expires,
unless there are alternative products that may be manufactured without infringing
the patent.
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domestic producers from foreign competition.' 3 8 Other elements bol-
stering a dominant firm's position are technological advantages,' 3 9
superior ability to make capital investment, 140 effective vertical integra-
tion, 14 1 or even a "very extensive and highly specialized sales
network."' 14 2
In short, Common Market competition law recognizes a full range
of indicators of market dominance besides market share. In United
Brands, the Advocate General's account of the respondent's commercial
ascent in the banana trade reads like a catalog of plausible barriers to
competition and therefore indicators of dominance:
The exceptionally heavy capital requirements for establishing and main-
taining banana acreage, the encroachment of diseases that to date have
forced successive shifts in the locale of growing areas, the recurrent blow-
down and floods that dictate multiple sources of supply as safety insur-
ance, and the exceptionally demanding logistics of distribution for an
almost uniquely perishable major trade commodity-all of these united to
make large-scale, vertically integrated organization a condition of suc-
cessful operation. 143
2. Abuse of Dominant Position
A firm does not violate EC law merely by achieving dominance because
Article 86 prohibits only the abuse of a dominant position that affects
trade between Member States. 144
a. Definition of "Abuse"
Although the text of Article 86 stops short of actually defining abuse of a
dominant position, it lists particular abuses:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any negotiable purchase or selling
prices or of any other negotiable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
or (d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a
party of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the
contract. 145
138. Id.
139. Hoffman-LaRoche, 1979 E.C.R. at 522, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 276 ("technologi-
cal advantages" sustained manufacturer's market power).
140. Id., 1979 E.C.R. at 522, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 273.
141. Id., 1979 E.C.R. at 522, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 276.
142. Id.
143. United Brands (A.G. Opinion), 1978 E.C.R. at 330-31, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at
461.
144. BRT v. SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. at 323, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 282-83.
145. EEC TREATY art. 86(a)-(d). See generally John T. Lang, Monopolisation and the
Definition of "Abuse" of a Dominant Position under Article 86 EEC Treaty, 16 COMMON MR'r.
L. REV. 345 (1979).
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There is general agreement, however, that these examples do not
constitute "an exhaustive enunciation of the sort of abuses of a domi-
nant position prohibited by the Treaty."1 46 Fortunately, the ECJ has
supplemented these examples with a two-prong definition of abuse of
dominant position. First, there must be a restraint on competition, and, sec-
ond, the dominant enterprise must have used "different[methods]from those
which [govern] normal competition in products or services on the basis of the
transactions of traders." 147
b. Strengthening of Market Position and Proportionality
An important element of abuse is that a concern use its power to
strengthen market dominance "in such a way that the degree of domi-
nance reached substantially fetters competition."' 148 In Tetra Pak, the
Advocate General, citing Continental Can, described conduct fortifying
dominance and substantially fettering competition as "the first decisive
element of abusive conduct."1 49 Furthermore, the "means and proce-
dure" used to strengthen market position are not relevant to finding
abuse. 150
Another important command under EC law requires that an under-
taking not limit competition disproportionality. United Brands delineated
the concept of proportionality when it found an enterprise had abused
its dominance when it "raised obstacles, the effect of which went beyond
the objective to be obtained."' 5 1 The doctrine of proportionality was
freshly recounted in Tetra Pak:
the undertaking in a dominant position may act in a profit-oriented way,
strive through its efforts to improve its market position and pursue its
legitimate interests. But in so doing it may employ only such methods as
are necessary to pursue those legitimate aims. In particular it may not act
in a way which, foreseeably, will limit competition more than is
necessary. 152
c. Responsibility of Dominant Firms
No provision of the Treaty requires a dominant concern to conduct its
business in a way that "makes no economic sense" or to act "against its
146. Case 6/72, Europemballage v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 245, 1973
C.M.L.R. 199, 224. Judge Kirschner has stated that these examples "point to limits
which the undertaking in the dominant position must respect even in the case of
activities which fall outside the examples ...." Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 361
(A.G. Opinion).
147. See, e.g., Case 31/80, NV L'Oreal v. PVBA de Nieuwe AMCK, 1980 E.C.R.
3775, 3794, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 255 (emphasis added).
148. Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 245, 1973 C.M.L.R. at 223.
149. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 359 (A.G. Opinion).
150. Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 245, 1973 C.M.L.R. at 225.
151. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 289, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 494.
152. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 361 (A.G. Opinion). See also United Brands,
1978 E.C.R. at 293, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 496 (an undertaking may take such reason-
able steps as appropriate to protect its commercial interests).
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legitimate interest,"' 5 3 and indeed Article 86 "will even accept the total
absence of any competition, i.e., a complete monopoly." 154 Neverthe-
less, a firm with market power is not free to roam untrammeled through
the market, for, in practice, the European Community has hobbled dom-
inant firms' conduct in two ways: First, the European Court of Justice
has impressed upon each dominant enterprise a "special responsibility
not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in
the Common Market."' 5 5 Second, the ECJ has devised an "objective"
test for abuse, based on a number of diverse factors under which it
judges dominant firms' conduct.
An enterprise may not be able to determine its special responsibil-
ity, for the Commission may characterize acts committed by a dominant
firm as "abusive" while allowing the same conduct by less powerful
undertakings under conditions of normal competition. 156 Thus Tetra
Pak might well have been unaware that its acquisition of an exclusive
patent license for arguably inoperable technology was anticompetitive
abuse.
Ironically, the ECJ's "objective" definition of abuse, which ignores
an undertaking's intent, does not settle the murkiness surrounding a
dominant firm's responsibility: "The concept of abuse is an objective con-
cept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position
which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result
of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of com-
petition is weakened .... "-57 The practice of using a plethora of traits
to make an "objective" finding of dominance has brought criticism that
the Commission has failed to develop a coherent, economically sound
framework of analysis, preferring instead to consider a case-by-case
check-list of factors.' 5 8
Notably, the Court has accepted the view that "abusive" conduct
itself may show dominant position. To find that a concern holds a domi-
nant market position, "it may be advisable to take account . . .of the
facts put forward as acts amounting to abuses without necessarily having
to acknowledge that they are abuses."' 5 9 In effect, the ECJ may find
abuse of dominant position upon a showing of abuse, even before a
153. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 360 (A.G. Opinion).
154. Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 256, 1973 C.M.L.R. at 208 (A.G. Opinion).
155. Case 322/81, NV Nederalandische Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commis-
sion, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3511, [1985] C.M.L.R. 282, 327. Accord Tetra Pak, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. at 389; see also Tetra Pak, (1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 360 (A.G. Opinion).
156. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 75, at 409.
157. Hoffman-LaRoche, 1979 E.C.R. at 541, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 290 (emphasis
added). See also Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 384-85; Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson
v. Pompes Funebres des Regions Liberees SA, 1988 E.C.R. 2479, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R.
984; Cases 142 & 156/84, British American Tobacco Co., Ltd. v. Commission, 1987
E.C.R. 4487, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 24.
158. 2 HAWK, supra note 52, at 801.
159. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 278, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 487.
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dominant position is established. 160 This technique of inferring domi-
nance from abuse of dominant position has probably not enhanced
major EC enterprises' sense of legal certainty.
Thus, an internationally powerful enterprise must keep abreast of
the potential effects of its agreements, first, by considering many "objec-
tive" factors leading to dominance and anticompetitive abuse, and, sec-
ond, by fulfilling its special responsibility not to distort competition. As
a result, a large firm may be unable to ensure that its contractual agree-
ments are legal under Community law, and it may unintentionally abuse
its dominant position.
In summary, the European Community will allow an enterprise to
acquire a dominant position in a relevant market, even to the point of
100 percent market share, but any firm in a dominant position must not
interfere with competition by abnormal means. As part of its special
obligation, the dominant firm may not use its power to undermine the
remaining competition in order to strengthen its position. It has the
duty to proceed by means legitimately proportionate to its competitive
aims.
3. Interrelationship of Articles 85 and 86
This part of Section III will consider the interaction of Articles 85 and
86, the core issue in Tetra Pak.
Both Articles 85 and 86 strive to maintain healthy competition in
the Common Market, 161 yet they play separate roles. First and fore-
most, the two provisions target different types of players in the market:
Article 85 is directed at bilateral or multilateral agreements, whereas
Article 86 reaches activity by a single firm as well.' 62 Therefore,
although a single undertaking can abuse its dominant position, infringe-
ment of Article 85 requires collaboration or concerted action with
another firm.
Second, Article 85 has a unique mechanism for creating exceptions
to its prohibitions by means of individual exemption or block exemp-
tion, pursuant to Regulations 17 and 19/65, respectively. The Court of
Justice has stated that the Commission cannot create express exceptions
to the interdictions of abusive market power under Article 86.163 In
effect, Article 86 stands as an absolute prohibition. Furthermore, since
Article 86 is a provision of the EEC constitution, it preempts exemptions
extended by the Commission under powers emanating from secondary
160. One critic of the Court's approach, arguing that the ECJ has forged a "causal
link" between dominance and abuse, has warned that "one should be careful to dis-
tinguish which way the causation runs" in order to avoid a wholly circular definition
of abuse of dominant position. 2 HAWK, supra note 52, at 824. This approach may, in
the words of another authority, "give rise to rather circular reasoning, and should be
treated with caution." BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 75, at 408 n.58.
161. Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 244, 1973 C.M.L.R. at 224.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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legislation. 164 The Commission recapitulated this precept six months
before Tetra Pak was decided, stressing that agreements resulting from
an abuse of dominant position cannot enjoy exemption, either under
Regulation 17 individual exemptions or under group exemption. 165
On the other hand, an undertaking that is unquestionably dominant
within the terms of Article 86 can enjoy block exemption, provided its
agreement fulfills all the conditions set forth by Article 85(3). For exam-
ple, Tetra Pak did not have to forego the exclusivity of its patent license
due to its sheer dominance, but rather because it could not comply with
exemption qualifications. The Commission invoked the withdrawal
clause of the Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, 6 6 exercising its discre-
tion to disallow exemption whenever an exempted agreement fails to
meet the conditions of Article 85(3).167
As "guardian of the Treaty," the EC Commission often focuses on
the basic purposes of the Treaty, especially the general forbiddance of
"prevention, restriction or distortion of competition." 168 The provi-
sions of the treaty and secondary legislation encourage continuous vigi-
lance. First, Articles 85(3)(a) & (b) provide explicit conditions for
extending exemption initially; second, Regulation 17 expressly author-
izes the Commission to revoke individual exemption whenever a party
abuses an exemption; 169 and third, Regulation 19/65 expressly allows
withdrawal of block exemption whenever the Commission finds that an
exempted agreement has "certain effects which are incompatible with
the conditions laid down in Article 85(3)."' 17 This statutory fail-safe
mechanism, which urges constant review of agreements in light of the
Treaty's basic tenets, dovetails with the European Court's "teleological"
interpretation 17 1 of the provisions of Articles 85 and 86.
4. Interpretation of Articles 85 and 86
Community institutions have interpreted Articles 85 and 86 to serve the
overall aims of the Common Market. Although the European Court
164. See Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. 838, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 102, 18. (A.G.
Opinion):
[U]nlike in Article 85(3) no provision is made in the EEC Treaty for any
exemption from the prohibition on abuses of dominant positions, nor is any
such exemption conceivable: abuses cannot be approved, or at any rate not
in a community which recognizes the rule of law as its highest principle. (cita-
tion omitted).
165. Decca Navigator Systems, 1989 O.J. (L 43) at 45. See also Continental Can, 1973
E.C.R. at 244, 1973 C.M.L.R. at 224 (restriction of competition cannot be allowed by
virtue of fact that a dominant firm is successful).
166. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 O.J. (L 272) at 42.
167. See Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, art. 9. This power to
revoke the benefit of an exemption is, however, rarely used. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra
note 75, at 373.
168. EEC TREATY art. 85(1).
169. Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 8(3)(d).
170. Regulation 19/65, supra note 85, art. 7. See also Patent-Licensing Block
Exemption, supra note 4, art. 9.
171. See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
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usually begins with a literal interpretation of the Treaty, 17 2 the Court of
Justice has shown a marked preference for focusing on the purposes of
the Treaty. 173 In this regard, the Court has held that the guiding design
of the competition-law Articles is to preserve the principles of Article 2
and Article 3(0 of the Treaty. 174 Article 2, the more general of the two
provisions, sets out as the EEC's task the promotion of "a harmonious
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expan-
sion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of liv-
ing and closer relationships between its Member States."' 7 5 In turn,
Article 3(f) directs the Community to establish a "system ensuring that
competition should not be distorted in the Common Market."' 76
Although critics have complained that this teleological approach
leads to unpredictable interpretations of Treaty provisions, 17 7 the
method seems to have met with general acceptance as having yielded
sufficiently coherent legal principles. 178 In effect, the Court views the
individual competition Articles as crystalizations of the overriding goals
of the European Community. 179
C. Special Problems of Intellectual Property' 8 0
Tetra Pak clarified the relationship between abuse of dominant position
under Article 86 and group exemption under Article 85(3), regardless of
subject matter. Nevertheless, Tetra Pak also reveals the parallel demands
made by national patent law and Community-wide competition law. 18 '
Like other intellectual property rights, patents are created by national
172. TIMOTHY MiLLETr, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES 75 (1990).
173. Id. at 74.
174. See Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 244, 1973 C.M.L.R. at 224.
175. EEC TREATY art. 2.
176. Id. art. 3(f).
177. DavidJ. Gerber, Law and Abuse of Economic Power in Europe, 62 TUL. L. REV. 57,
103 (1987).
178. Id. at 104.
179. See United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 277, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 486. (Art. 86 is an
application of general objectives laid down in Art. 3(f)); Joined Cases 133 - 136/85,
Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. Bundesanstatt fur Landwirtschaftliche
Marktordnung, 1987 E.C.R. 2289 (Art. 3(f) of Treaty shows task of Community, Arts.
85 & 86 contain rules applicable to traders); Michelin, 1983 E.C.R. at 3503, (1985] 1
C.M.L.R. at 321 (Art. 86 application of general objective of activities of Community
laid down in Art. 3(o).
180. The term "intellectual property," includes patents, copyrights, trademarks,
industrial designs, know-how, and attendant licenses and rights. "Industrial
property" is a nearly synonymous term although it may not reach copyrights for
artistic works. See generally B. I. CAWTHRA, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE EEC:
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT (1973); CORNISH, supra note 1; PATRICK
HEARN, THE BUSINESS OF INDUSTRIAL LICENSING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PATENTS,
KNow-How, TRADEMARKS AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGN (2d ed. 1986); HARTMUT
JOHANNES, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
(1976).
181. See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 46, at 91-141; GOYDER, supra note 52, at
253-295; 2 HAWK, supra note 52, at 575-735; WHISH, supra note 75, at 345-383.
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legislation, which, in effect, grants a monopoly for exploitation of the
technology or process.1 8 2
The Commission has had to address the tension that results when
state-based intellectual property rights undermine the policies favoring
undistorted competition and free movement of goods within the Com-
munity.18 3 Article 222 of the Treaty further aggravated the problem by
providing that the "Treaty shall in no way prejudice the system existing
in Member States in respect of property,"18 4 which of course includes
intellectual property rights. Finally, there is at present no provision for
a Community-based patent system.185
The inherent conflict between nationally recognized intellectual
property rights and the Community goal of encouraging the "free move-
ment of goods" has been minimized by a string of cases in the Court of
Justice. The Court has articulated the principle that, on the one hand,
"the Treaty leaves the existence and substance of industrial property rights
untouched (the national legislature decides on these questions...),,,186
but on the other hand, "their exercise is completely subject to Community
law." s18 7 As recently as 1990, the Court repeated its support of the
existence/exercise dichotomy in the context of abuse of dominant posi-
tion under Article 86.188
Thus, the Court regards intellectual property rights, hovering as
they do between the Community Treaty and national law, as ambivalent
creatures, born in a single State but being exercised within the Commu-
nity as a whole. Consequently, even though the exclusive agreement
between British Technology Group and Tetra Pak was based upon a pat-
182. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 75, at 319-20.
183. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 59
(1972).
184. EEC TREATY art. 222.
185. The Community Patent Convention, signed by all EC Member States in 1975,
is intended to "provide automatic protection for all patented inventions to owners
resident in Member States, without there being any need to designate those countries
in which the patent is required to operate." HEARN, supra note 180, at 55. An appli-
cant would retain the right to obtain a national patent, however. CORNISH, supra note
1, at 77 n.80. This Convention may become effective as early as December 31, 1992,
but a number of obstacles must be overcome. See id. at 77-78.
186. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 506, 1971
C.M.L.R. 631, 647 (emphasis added).
187. Id. (emphasis added). See also Case C-10/89, CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG, 1990
E.C.R. 3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (Article 36 of Treaty does not affect existence of
industrial-property rights, but exercise of such rights may be affected by prohibitions
in the Treaty); Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng, Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 122 (existence of patent rights is a matter solely of national law; use of
patent rights comes into ambit of EEC law when such use contributes to abuse of
dominant position); Case 434/85, Allen & Hanburys, Ltd. v. Generics, 1988 E.C.R.
1245, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 701 (existence of rights in matters of industrial and com-
mercial policy not affected by EEC law, but exercise of same may be restricted by
Treaty provisions).
188. Case 53/87, Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per
Autoveicoli v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 1988 E.C.R. 6039, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 265.
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ent which came into existence under U.K. law, its exercise within the Com-
mon Market subjected the agreement to scrutiny by the Community
Commission. 189
D. EC Jurisdiction over Non-EC firms
In Tetra Pak, neither party was a Common Market firm. Tetra Pak was
registered in Sweden and complainant Elopak was Norwegian. Never-
theless, the European Community has jurisdiction over agreements
between non-EC firms which affect competition within the Common
Market.
Article 85 expressly prohibits agreements "which have as their
object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market.. .190 Similarly, Article 86 forbids abuses by
dominant firms "within the Common Market or within a substantial part of
it in so far as it may affect trade between Member States."' 19 1 The geo-
graphical phrase "within the Common Market" implies that the Com-
munity has jurisdiction over any agreement that manifests effects within
the Common Market. 192 Relatively early on, the Commission stated
that EC law applies to any restriction of competition that may "produce
within the Common Market effects set out in Article 85(l)." 19 3
The Court of Justice recendy clarified the jurisdictional inquiry by
endorsing the "qualified effects" standard, 194 first articulated by the
Advocate General in the Dyestuffs case. Under this standard, the EC may
exercise its jurisdiction over foreign enterprises whenever anticompeti-
tive conduct evinces a direct and immediate, reasonably foreseeable,
and substantial effect within the Community. 195 This jurisdictional cri-
terion is generally accepted under international law.19 6
189. See Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 363-65 (A.G. Opinion). This aspect of EEC
competition law became an underlying motif in the Tetra Pak litigation. Further con-
sideration of this problem, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. See also Patent
Licensing: Advocate-General's Opinion that Agreement Entitled to Benefit of Article 85(3) Block
Exemption May None the Less Contravene Article 86, 12 E.I.P.R. D- 117 (1990).
190. EEC TREATY art. 85(1) (emphasis added).
191. Id. art. 86 (emphasis added).
192. BARACK, supra note 75, at 37-38.
193. Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R.
619, 1972 C.M.L.R. 557. The Commission has power "to act against non-Commu-
nity enterprises under the competition rules, wherever the effects of the restrictive
practice [are] felt within the Common Market." EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SIxTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 37 (1976).
194. Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-117/85, 125-129/85, Re Wood Pulp Car-
tel: A. AhIstrom Oy v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5225-27, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R.
901,931,941.
195. Imperial Chemical Industries, 1972 E.C.R. at 694, 1972 C.M.L.R. at 604.
196. For jurisdiction under international law, see generally BARACK, supra note 75, at
11-39; see also Evan Breibart, Note, The Wood Pulp Case: The Application of European
Economic Community Competition Law to Foreign Based Undertakings, 19 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 149 (1989).
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1. Enforcement and Procedure Under EEC Competition Law 9 7
Article 85(2) dictates that "any agreements or decisions prohibited pur-
suant to this Article shall be null and void."'19 8 Article 86 states that
"action ... to take improper advantage of a dominant position.., shall
hereby be prohibited."' 9 9 The Treaty further calls upon the Council to
use fines and penalties to compel compliance with the competition arti-
cles.20 0 Regulation 17 empowers the Commission, by releasing Deci-
sions, to terminate agreements that infringe Articles 85 and 86.201
The Commission may begin an enforcement action either "upon its
own initiative, '20 2 or upon application by a Member State or by "natural
or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest." 20 3 In practice, the
Commission will generally investigate all but the most frivolous com-
plaints. 20 4 Tetra Pak's problems with the Commission began when
Elopak made two applications pursuant to article 3 of Regulation 17, in
which Elopak alleged that Tetra Pak had violated Articles 85 and 86.205
2. Enforcement of EC Competition Law in National Courts
The ECJ has held that denying national courts jurisdiction to enforce
directly applicable provisions of Community law would deprive individ-
ual citizens of EC Member States of rights created by the Treaty.20 6
Juxtaposed with this holding is the ECJ's further proscription that "[t]he
imperative force of the Treaty ... could not vary from State to State by
the effect of internal measures .... "207 As a result, both Community
and national authorities enforce Articles 85 and 86, including the provi-
sion in Article 85(2) for automatic nullity of infringing agreements. The
Court has consistently held, however, that whenever Community rules
of competition conflict with national laws, "Community law takes prece-
dence."'20 8 Decisions of national courts applying EC law bind neither
197. See generally BARACK, supra note 75, at 219-301; CAROL M. CROSSWELL, LEGAL
AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL BusINESs 22-43 (1980); 2 HAWK, supra
note 52, at 17-145; C. S. KERSE, EEC ANrrRusT PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1988); WHisH,
supra note 75, at 243-263.
198. EEC TREATY art. 85(2).
199. Id. art. 86.
200. Id. art. 87(2)(a). The Commission may levy a fine of 1,000-1,000,000 units of
account for the intentional or negligent infringement of Article 85(1) or Article 86.
Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 15(2). A unit of account, or "Ecu," is based on a
"market basket" of currencies, and as of January 1992 one unit was equivalent to
approximately $1.34 or DM 2.04. 1992 O.J. (C 1) 1 (information of the
Commission).
201. Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 3(1).
202. Id.
203. Id. art. 3(2)(a) & (b).
204. KERSE, supra note 197, at 61.
205. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 OJ. (L 272) at 27.
206. Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. 51, 63, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238,
271.
207. Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1 (French text
only), 1969 C.M.L.R. 100, 119.
208. See, e.g., Walt Wilhelm, 1969 C.M.L.R. at 119.
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the Community Commission nor Courts. Should controversies arise
regarding interpretation of the Treaty, acts by Community institutions,
or interpretation of EC legislation, a national court may request a pre-
liminary ruling from the Court ofJustice.20 9
IV. Tetra Pak's Case
This section will outline the arguments Tetra Pak presented in defense
of its exclusive patent license, contentions rejected by the Commission
and ultimately by the Court of First Instance. One should remember,
however, that the sole issue before the Court was the applicability of
Article 86 when an agreement has qualified for Article 85(3) block
exemption.
A. Tetra Pak's Defense Before the Commission
By the time of its oral hearing before the Commission, Tetra Pak had
voluntarily relinquished its exclusive patent license on BTG's patented
ultraviolet sterilization process. 2 10 Even though both Tetra Pak and
BTG preferred an exclusive agreement, Tetra Pak and Elopak were
negotiating with BTG for nonexclusive licenses. 2 1 1
In its defense, Tetra Pak argued, first, that it held no dominant posi-
tion in the relevant market and had consequently committed no abuses
infringing Article 86, and, second, that its patent license fell within the
Patent-Licensing Block Exemption. 2 12 Tetra Pak also maintained that
"further development on the basic technology" covered by the BTG
license would "require a considerable financial investment" on the part
of Tetra Pak. 2 13
1. Infringement of Article 86
Rejecting all of Tetra Pak's defenses, the Commission decided that
Tetra Pak had abused its dominant position in the relevant market. The
Commission defined the product market as "machines and technology
for filling board cartons under aseptic conditions with UHT treated
liquids .... especially milk." 2 14 It found the geographic market to be
the entire EC because, first, even though demand varied slightly among
Member States, there were significant markets for every kind of packag-
ing and filling machines in each State,2 15 and, second, transportation
costs did not erect barriers along national boundaries. 2 16
The Commission supported its finding of dominance by citing five
factors: (1) Tetra Pak's large market share, 91.8 percent for aseptic fill-
209. EEC TREATY art. 177. See infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
210. Tetra Pak Comm'n Decision, 1988 O.J. (L 272) at 29.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 31.
214. Id. at 33.
215. Id. at 38.
216. Id.
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ing machines for UHT products; (2) Tetra Pak's early development of
UHT technology, vast experience, and protection by various patents; (3)
particularly high barriers to market entry; (4) Tetra Pak's exclusive
access to BTG technology, which would reinforce its technological lead
over potential rivals and reduce the possibility of effective competition;
and (5) the maturity of the milk market, allowing no room for overall
expansion. 2 17
Having established Tetra Pak's dominance, the Commission found
that Tetra Pak had abused its position because it had strengthened its dom-
inant position by using disproportionate means. First, the acquisition of
the exclusive patent not only strengthened Tetra Pak's existing domi-
nance but also prevented, or considerably delayed, the entry of any new
competition. 2iS Citing Continental Can, the Commission declared that
"[a]buse may occur if any undertaking in a dominant position strength-
ens such position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached
substantially fetters competition .... ,,219
Tetra Pak's exclusivity was an affront to the EC's principle of pro-
portionality because Tetra Pak could easily have continued its opera-
tions with a non-exclusive patent. In the Commission's words, the
exclusivity of the license could not be "objectively justified" because
"the little protection that may be necessary to encourage Tetra [Pak] to
bear any technical and commercial risks associated with the develop-
ment and dissemination of new technology is not sufficient to overcome
the extremely serious disadvantages created by the loss of competition
entailed by this exclusivity." 220
Regarding the "effect on trade between Member States," the Com-
mission determined that Tetra Pak's exclusive license, which covered
virtually the entire Common Market, exhibited the requisite substantial
impact on competition within the EC.22 1
To summarize, the Commission found that Tetra Pak infringed
Article 86 because (1) it was the dominant undertaking in the relevant
market, (2) it abused its dominant position by using an exclusive patent
affording competitive advantages disproportionate to its legitimate busi-
ness interests, and (3) the abuse affected trade between Member States.
2. Infringement of Article 85
The Commission determined that, although the "exclusivity of the
license fell within the scope of Article 85(1)," the specific restrictions
within the BTG-Tetra Pak agreement conformed with the "white list" of
the Patent-Licensing Block Exemption.2 2 2 Nevertheless, the otherwise
automatic exemption of the agreement failed because, inasmuch as
217. Id. at 39.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 40.
220. Id. at 41.
221. Id. at 40.
222. Id. at 41-42. See supra notes 88-90.
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Tetra Pak did not fulfill the conditions of Article 85(3), the Commission
would have withdrawn the exemption. 223 Exclusivity may be exempted
from Article 85(1) only when it is "necessary to encourage competition
.. but in other market circumstances where it is detrimental to competi-
tion it must fall within the scope of Article 85(1)."224
The license agreement failed to meet the conditions of Article 85(3)
because there were no products or services within the territory capable
of competing with Tetra Pak.225 Furthermore, consumers did not bene-
fit from the elimination of competition. 22 6 The resultant concentration
of market power might even "hinder promotion of technical and eco-
nomic progress .... ,,227 Finally, the exclusive license was never shown
to be indispensable to any legitimate business advantage. 228
The infringement of Article 85 was fairly plain. Having failed to
meet the conditions of Article 85(3), the exemption was withdrawn, and
Tetra Pak's license agreement was caught by the provisions of Article
85(1) and rendered void by Article 85(2). As the license would tend to
have as its "object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market,"' 229 it was "automatically
void." 230
B. Tetra Pak before the Court of First Instance
Tetra Pak applied to the Court of First Instance (CFI) for a declaration
that the Commission's decision was void as a matter of law. Tetra Pak
did not appeal the Commission's findings of market dominance or
abuse, but claimed the Commission infringed Article 85(3) and Article 86
by applying Article 86 to an agreement exempt under Article 85(3).231
Tetra Pak posed three objections to the Commission's treatment of
its licensing agreement: (i) that a "schematic" analysis of Articles 85
and 86 precluded the Commission's finding,23 2 (ii) that the Commis-
sion's decision violated the principle of legal certainty,233 and (iii) that
the Commission had violated the principle of uniform application of
Community law.2 3 4
1. Tetra Pak's "Schematic" Defense
Tetra Pak averred that, as Articles 85 and 86 aspire to the same objec-
tive-to protect undistorted competition within the Common Market-
223. Id. at 33.
224. Id. at 42.
225. Id. at 43.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. EEC TREATY art. 85(1).
230. Id. art. 85(2).
231. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 380.
232. Id. at 381-82.
233. Id. at 387-88.
234. Id. at 389.
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they should not be interpreted to contradict each other.2 35 According
to Tetra Pak, by giving effect to Article 86 even when an agreement had
been exempted under Article 85(3), the Commission would contradict
itself by authorizing certain conduct under Article 85(3) while simulta-
neously prohibiting the same conduct under Article 86.236 As a conse-
quence, until the Commission acts to withdraw exemption, an express
block exemption under Article 85(3) should imply a concurrent exemp-
tion from the demands of Article 86.237
2. Tetra Pak's Legal Certainty Defense
Tetra Pak also argued that the principle of legal certainty precluded
application of Article 86 to prohibit conduct that was exempt under
Article 85(3).238 Tetra Pak sought to persuade the CFI that as long as
the Commission had taken no positive action to withdraw an exemption,
there was a legitimate expectation that an agreement was lawful. 23 9
Tetra Pak argued further that "negative clearance," the procedure
under which the Commission may specifically approve an agreement, 2 40
could not assure legal certainty for a number of reasons. First, one of
the "primary functions" of block exemption is to enable firms to enter
agreements without having to consult the Commission;24 1 the negative
clearance application requirement would "undermine the efficacy" of
the exemption. Second, negative clearance does not protect an under-
taking from incurring fines between the time of application and deci-
sion. 242 Third, negative clearance may not be enforceable in national
courts pending a Commission investigation. 243 Finally, negative clear-
ance has no binding effect in national courts. 24 4
3. Tetra Pak's Uniform Application of Law Defense
Finally, Tetra Pak argued that if Article 86 abuse of dominant position
applies to agreements qualifying for block exemption under Article 85,
national courts are then empowered to prohibit conduct the EC Com-
mission has expressly allowed. 24 5 As this usurpation by a municipal
court would undermine the principle of uniform application of Commu-
nity law, Tetra Pak urged the Court to find, in the interests of consis-
235. Id. at 380.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 387.
239. Id. at 387-88.
240. "Negative Clearance. Upon application ... the Commission may certify that,
on the basis of facts in its possession, there are no grounds under Article 85(1) or
Article 86 of the Treaty for action on its part in respect of an agreement, decision, or
practice." Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 2. See infra notes 324-32 and accompany-
ing text.
241. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 388.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 389.
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tency, that application of Article 86 is incompatible with the protections
that block exemptions promise.246
C. The Court's Response to Tetra Pak's Arguments
Although the Court of First Instance acknowledged that the Court of
Justice had never expressly considered the issue of reconciling Article
86 with block exemption,2 47 it ruled that Tetra Pak's arguments were
without merit, dismissed the application, and upheld the Commission
Decision.248
1. CFI's Response to the Schematic Defense
The Court's first step in reconciling the application of Article 86 to an
agreement to which the Commission had granted group exemption was
to turn to a teleological interpretation 249 of the Treaty: Articles 85 and
86 are complimentary rules, dedicated to the common objective embod-
ied in Article 3(f), that competition not be distorted.250
Tetra Pak had urged that, even though Treaty provisions allowing
for exemptions do not explicitly mention Article 86, the "implied
exemption in respect of abuse of dominant position" 251 demanded a
two-step analysis similar to that under Article 85: (i) does the conduct in
question have the "object or effect of preventing, restricting or dis-
torting competition within the common market," 252 and (ii) "if so, does
the conduct nevertheless have overall a pro-competitive effect because it
contributes to promoting technical or economic progress. ' 253 The
Court, however, found this two-step approach unsuitable for Article 86,
because of the absolute bar against abusive conduct.254
The CFI also rejected the claim that Article 86 should operate only
after the Commission's positive action of withdrawing an exemption, on
the grounds that this approach would be tantamount to creating a con-
current exemption from the prohibition of market-dominant abuse. 255 The
Court raised an additional ultra vires objection rooted in the hierarchy of
legal rules of the European Community. Because the Treaty of Rome
mandates the prohibition of abuse of dominant position, and since the
Council has never promulgated secondary legislation allowing the Com-
mission to make exceptions to Article 86, no secondary legislation
would justify a derogation from Article 86.256 Thus, the CFI found
Tetra Pak's theory of "implied exemption" constitutionally untenable.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 383.
248. Id. at 390.
249. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
250. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 383.
251. Id. at 382.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 385.
255. Id. at 385-86.
256. Id.
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The CFI also raised practical objections to Tetra Pak's arguments of
implied or concurrent exemption. When the Commission investigates
an application for individual exemption under Article 85(3), it will, in
practice, consider compliance with Article 86. The same is not true for
block exemptions, which, by definition, involve no case-by-case "posi-
tive assessment" of the conditions laid out in Article 85(3).257 As a
result, abusive conduct is to be assessed strictly within the confines of
Article 86,258 without reference to Article 85(1) and its permissible der-
ogations. Thus, market dominance is irrelevant to an agreement's quali-
fication for group exemption; under EEC law, the Commission will not
deny a block exemption to a market-dominating firm. Block exemption
does not, however, shield against an allegation of abuse.
2. Advocate General's Response to Schematic Defense
In response to Tetra Pak's schematic argument, Advocate General
Kirschner resorts at the outset to a teleological interpretation, empha-
sizing Article 3(f) of the Treaty, which demands that competition not be
"distorted." In reaching this goal, however, the application of either
Article 85 or 86 may be sufficient. 259 Further, Judge Kirschner cited a
line of ECJ cases2 60 confirming that the two articles are concurrently
applicable. 26 1
a. Article 86 and Individual Exemptions
In a digression, Advocate General Kirschner found four "indications"
that Article 86 retains its force even after individual exemption has been
achieved. 2 62
First, quite simply, the plain language of Regulation 17 provides for
exemption only from Article 85(1), not from Article 86.263 Second, in
contrast to an individual exemption, which must specify time limits, con-
ditions, and obligations, 2 64 the absolute prohibition of abusive conduct
can be neither limited nor subject to condition.2 6 5 Third, a "clear paral-
lel" exists between Article 86's categorical prohibition and Regulation
17's provision that the Commission may revoke an exemption whenever
257. Id. at 386.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 345 (A.G. Opinion).
260. See Case 32/65, Italian Government v. Council and Commission, 1966 E.C.R.
563, 592, 1969 C.M.L.R. 39, 63; Hoffman-LaRoche, 1979 E.C.R. at 550, [1979] 3
C.M.L.R. at 297 (confirming the concurrent applicability of Articles 85 and 86); Case
7/82, Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (GVL) v. Com-
mission, 1983 E.C.R. 483, 525, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 645, 668 (the fact that the conduct
of a dominant undertaking falls within Article 85(3) does not preclude the applica-
tion of Article 86); Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. 838, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102 (Articles 85
and 86 can be applied concurrently where dominant firm has restricted competition).
261. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 346 (A.G. Opinion).
262. Id. at 349.
263. Id.
264. See Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 8(1).
265. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 349 (A.G. Opinion).
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"parties abuse the [individual] exemption from the provisions of Article
85(l). ' 266 Judge Kirschner concluded from this parallel construction
that individual exemption cannot justify abusive conduct.267 Fourth,
while the Commission may levy fines for intentional or negligent
infringement of either Article 85(1) or 86,268 it may not impose a fine
during its consideration of a request for individual exemption, provided
the parties properly notify the agreement. 269 From this Judge Kirschner
concluded that for the duration of the decision process, Article 86 must
continue "to be applicable and have effects," even though the Commis-
sion's power to impose fines is suspended.270
Moreover, an agreement properly notified and granted individual
exemption will necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 86
because the Commission will thoroughly assess the agreement's compli-
ance with the conditions of Article 85(3), including benefit to consum-
ers, proportionality of the restrictions imposed, and the maintenance of
competition. 271
Turning to the problem of an agreement enjoying individual
exemption to which a dominant enterprise subsequently accedes, Judge
Kirschner noted that since such an agreement would remain unexam-
ined in the context of competitive distortion by a dominant firm,272 the
Commission may "reexamine ex nunc whether the exception from the
prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) is still justified." 273 In such a
case, the Commission's former exemption is not binding, and therefore
the Article 85(3) exemption will, in fact, be subject to the undertaking's
compliance with Article 86.274
b. Article 86 and Block Exemptions
Having thus demonstrated that the shield of individual exemption is
ablated once a dominant firm commits abusive conduct in the atmos-
phere of a distorted, noncompetitive market, Judge Kirschner turned to
the problem of block exemptions. He first established that all exemp-
tions, whether individual or categorical, are based on the common
assumption that the agreements they cover violate Article 85(1). Unlike
Regulation 17 exemptions, however, which involve investigation by DG
IV, block exemptions are grounded in a "general, abstract assessment,"
which assumes agreements are being launched under normal conditions
266. See Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 8(1)(d).
267. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 350 (A.G. Opinion).
268. See Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 15(2).
269. Id. art. 15(5). "[F]ines [for intentional or negligent infringement of Articles
85(1) or 86] shall not be imposed in respect of acts taking place: (a) after notification
to the Commission and before its decision in application of Article 85(3) or the
Treaty .... Id.
270. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 350 (A.G. Opinion).
271. Id. at 350-51.
272. Id. at 351.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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of competition. 27 5
The secondary legislation that undergirds the Commission's power
to create group exemptions, furthermore, refers expressly and exclu-
sively to Article 85, and provides no exemption from Article 86.276 The
Advocate General concluded that, just as the Commission is not bound
by its granting of an individual exemption after a DG IV investigation,
neither is it bound by a block exemption granted ex ante once a firm
achieves dominance and commits market-abusive conduct.2 77 In short,
Article 86 applies even when there is a valid block exemption. 2 78
3. CFI's Response to the Legal Certainty Defense
The CFI was unimpressed by Tetra Pak's arguments regarding legal cer-
tainty, and responded that block exemption is in fact designed to pro-
vide legal certainty.2 79 An exemption does not obviate a dominant
firm's responsibility not to abuse its dominant position. Therefore, no
firm can credibly defend its abusive conduct by pleading the alleged
"unpredictability of the application of Article 86."280
4. CFI's Response to the Uniform Application Defense
The CFI was similarly unmoved by Tetra Pak's arguments regarding
uniform application of Community law. The Court pointed to a consis-
tent line of ECJ cases showing that Article 86 has direct effect and con-
fers rights in national courts.2 8 i This principle of the primacy and
uniformity of EC law is not at all affected, however, by whether or not a
dominant firm's agreement qualifies for block exemption.
V. Implications for Other Dominant Firms Attempting to Avoid 86
A. The Tetra Pak Precedent in the Court of First Instance
In the aftermath of Tetra Pak, the question arises as to whether this deci-
sion in the Court of First Instance establishes a precedent in the Euro-
pean Community. In the past, the Court ofJustice, to which the CFI is
attached, 282 has tended to follow its own previous rulings, only excep-
275. Id. at 353.
276. The block-exemption regulations covering exclusive purchasing and exclu-
sive distribution agreements, Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83, expressly state that
they do not preclude the application of Article 86. Id. at 354. The recent block
exemptions in the air transport industry, authorized by Council Regulation 3976/87,
1987 O.J. (L 374) 9, expressly provide that infringement of Article 86 is grounds for
denial of categorical exemption. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 355. Similarly, the
only exemption created directly by the Council, Maritime Transport Regulation,
supra note 16, provides that an agreement incompatible with Article 86 will lose its
exemption. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 355 (A.G. Opinion).
277. Id. at 356.
278. Id. at 356-57.
279. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 388-89.
280. Id. at 389.
281. Id. at 390.
282. See supra note 55.
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tionally departing from precedent,28 3 even though it is not legally
bound by its own precedents. 284 Further, the Court ofJustice has ruled
that authorities in Member States are subject to its interpretations of
specific questions of Community law.28 5 In practice national courts
yield to the judgments of the ECJ. National courts retain the right, how-
ever, to raise the same question repeatedly in subsequent Article 177
references to Community Courts, regardless of past ECJ inter-
pretations. 28 6
At this early stage of its development, the extent to which the Court
of First Instance will be bound by its own decisions is not clear.2 87 What
is clear is that, if its judgment is overturned by the Court ofJustice, the
ECJ's ruling will take precedence, for the Protocol on the Statute of the
Court of Justice expressly provides that the CFI is bound by ECJ deci-
sions on points of law.28 8
283. BROWN & JACOBs, supra note 63, at 278.
284. MiLLE'rr, supra note 172, at 74. See also Case 112/76, Renato Manzoni v.
Fonds National de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs, 1977 E.C.R. 1647, [1978] 2
C.M.L.R. 416 (all national Courts are bound by ratio decidendi of ECJ except ECJ
itself; Advocate General's explanation of doctrine of stare decisis in relation to ECJ);
HP Bulmer, Ltd. v. J. Bollinger SA 1974 Ch. 401 (Eng. C.A.) [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 91
(ECJ not absolutely bound by its previous decisions); Case C-10/89, CNL-Sucal NV
v. HAG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (Court not bound by its own
precedent).
285. BROWN &JACOBS, supra note 63, at 282. In a consistent line of case law the
ECJ has held that, when national courts refer questions of law to the ECJ under Arti-
cle 177 of the Treaty, the Court of Justice will have jurisdiction to determine the
criteria by which courts in Member States are to interpret Community law. See Case
215/87, Heinz Schumacher v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main, 1989 E.C.R. 617,
[1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 465; Case 237/82,Jongeneel Kaas BV v. Netherlands, 1984 E.C.R.
483, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 53; Case 45/75, Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-
Grosshandels GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Landau/Pfalz, 1976 E.C.R. 181, [1976] 2
C.M.L.R. 1; Case 30/70, Otto Scheer v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fir Getreide und
Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1197, 1972 C.M.L.R. 255.
286. See Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV v. Nederlandse Belast-
ingsadministratie, 1963 E.C.R. 31, 1963 C.M.L.R. 224 (a similar legal issue may be
resubmitted to ECJ by national court); accord Case 283/8 1, Sri CILFIT v. Ministry of
Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472; Case 28/67, Molkerei-Zentrale, 1968
E.C.R. 143, 1968 C.M.L.R. 187 (ECJ expressly reconsiders previous ruling); Dyestuffs,
1981 E.C.R. 1191, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 593 (binding authority of ECJ judgments does
not bar national courts from making fresh references for interpretation to ECJ); Case
826/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. S.a.s. Mediterranea Importa-
zione, Rappresentanze, Esportazione Commercio, 1980 E.C.R. 2559, [1981] 1
C.M.L.R. I (ECJ judgments bind courts referring questions under Article 177, but
they do not prevent other courts from referring again for interpretation of the same
question).
287. MILLErr, supra note 172, at 74.
288. ECJ Protocol, supra note 57, art. 54. One commentator suggests that, since
"infringement of Community law by the Court of First Instance" is a ground for
appeal, and as Community law includes ECJ case law, the CFI is bound by relevant
clear and unambiguous ECJ precedents. MiLLEtr, supra note 172, at 74.
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B. Legal Similitude of Block Exemptions
The primary importance of Tetra Pak may be its lucid confirmation that,
once a dominant firm executes an abusive agreement, any protection
afforded by a block exemption will cease, along with the benefits of any
other relevant group exemptions. Abusive agreements are illegal in the
European Community, whether exempted or not. In view of its broad
rationale, Tetra Pak will not be limited to patent licenses; courts will
surely apply the holding to other subjects exempted under other cate-
gorical exemptions.
In considering the potential reach of Tetra Pak, it is useful to look at
the relationship between a given block exemption and another. First, all
derogations from Article 85(1) serve generally the same purpose. The
Commission has equated group exemptions and individual exemptions
inasmuch as they are "simply a particular form of the declaration of the
inapplicability provided for in Article 85(3)."289 This would indicate
that, despite their diverse subject matter, block exemptions are not func-
tionally distinct.
More fundamentally, Regulation 19/65 states that certain excepted
groups of agreements may be delineated only after the Commission has
acquired "sufficient experience" with certain types of agreement to be
sure they can fulfill the conditions set down by Article 85(3).290 Conse-
quently, the slowly cultivated exemptions-rooted in the Commission
experience of handling literally thousands of notifications over the years
and having a common ground of creation-can be expected to possess
an equivalent relationship to Article 86. Thus, upon a showing of abu-
sive conduct, sundry block-exemption regulations are not apt to be dif-
ferentiated-or spared.
Two relatively recent Commission block exemptions have specifi-
cally described the mutual interaction of block exemptions. The
Research and Development Block Exemption provides that agreements
executed in compliance therewith may also enjoy the protection of other
block exemptions. 291 Even though an agreement may not be eligible for
a specific R&D exemption, it may nevertheless find protection in another
block exemption. 292 Similarly, the Franchising Block Exemption29 3
provides that an agreement may be concurrently exempted under
another block exemption, assuming its has fulfilled the relevant condi-
tions of the latter.2 94 Thus, the Commission seemingly favors the inter-
changeability of the exemptions, and has expressly noted that, should an
289. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 118(1986) [hereinafter SIXTEENTH REPORT].
290. Regulation 19/65, supra note 85, Recital 4.
291. R&D Block Exemption, supra note 17, Recital 14.
292. VALENTINE KORAH, R&D AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 418/
85, 15 (1986).
293. Franchising Block Exemption, supra note 13.
294. Id. Recital 17. Undertakings may not, however, "benefit from a combination of
the provisions of this Regulation with those of another block exemption Regulation."
Id. (emphasis added).
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agreement not fully conform with the details of a group-exemption reg-
ulation, an enterprise may "establish that the conditions of another block
exemption are fulfilled." 29 5
Along similar lines, Judge Kirschner has stated that
despite their differences in points of detail, all block raemptions constitute
an instrument for implementing art. 85(3).... It would be contrary to the
system of the Treaty to destroy the uniform application of art. 85 and 86
in the various sectors covered by block-exemption regulations by drawing
artificial distinctions. 29 6
Hence Judge Kirschner has supported the contention that the Patent-
Licensing Block Exemption interacts with Article 86 in the same away as
any other block exemption. 29 7
In practical terms, Tetra Pak warns dominant firms that any agree-
ment formulated under the umbrella of a block exemption will be vul-
nerable if it potentially strengthens the firm's market power. In order to
avoid forfeiture, firms should look to possible safeguards available
under EEC competition law. 29 8
C. The "Positive Side" of EC Competition Law
The Commission has referred to a "whole range of exemptions or dero-
gations" from EEC competition law as the "other face of competition
policy, its positive side." 2 99 Even after Tetra Pak, a dominant firm still
vulnerable to an allegation of abusive conduct, despite full compliance
with a group exemption, may avail itself of an array of protective
devices. This part of Section V will survey the EEC provisions upon
which undertakings may rely to assure of the permissibility of their
agreements.
1. Agreements Exempt Ab Initio from EEC Competition Law
A dominant firm may rely on certain Treaty provisions that exempt par-
ticular transactions altogether from EEC competition law. 300 For exam-
ple, Articles 85 and 86 apply to EC agricultural products only as
determined by the Council, following the Common Agricultural Policy
stated in Article 43 of the Treaty.3 0 ' Similarly, Article 223 excludes
application of the competition Articles to the defense industry, certain
national-security items being expressly designated for exclusion by the
295. SIXTEENTH REPORT, supra note 289, at 118 (emphasis added).
296. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 356 (A.G. Opinion) (emphasis added).
297. Id.
298. See infra notes 299-382 and accompanying text.
299. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, Intro-
duction (1988) [hereinafter EIGHTEENTH REPORT].
300. See EEC TREATY arts. 39, 42, 43 (limiting application of competition rules to
agriculture sector); id. art. 84 (special rules for transport); id art. 223(1)(b) (exclud-
ing defense items from competition rules); id. art. 232(1) (exempting ECSC Treaty
provisions from Treaty of Rome provisions); id. art. 232(2) (providing that Treaty of
Rome shall not derogate from EURATOM Treaty).
301. EEC TREATY arts. 42 & 43.
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Council.3 0 2
Moreover, Article 232 of the Treaty of Rome expressly excludes
agreements subject to the rules of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity from the legislative jurisdiction of the EEC Treaty, including Arti-
cles 85 and 86.303 The Treaty also makes special provisions for various
aspects of transportation.3 0 4
2. De Minimis Exemption - Appreciable Effect
The Court ofJustice has determined that Common Market competition
law will not reach an agreement, even one jeopardizing Community
principles of competition, unless it "affect[s] trade between Member
States and [has] the object or effect of interfering with competition
within the Common Market." °3 0 5 Several ECJ judgments have similarly
fashioned a de minimis principle limiting application of Article 85(1).306
Although the Commission's Notice on Agreements of Minor Impor-
tance30 7 is binding neither on the Court of First Instance nor on munici-
pal tribunals, it has offered guidance in evaluating the "appreciable
effects" of agreements.3 0 8 The Commission states that minor agree-
ments need not be notified to the Commission at all, although they may
be.30 9 The financial criteria demand that an enterprise's share of the
relevant market shall not exceed five percent, and the aggregate "turno-
ver" of all the firms party to the agreement shall not exceed 200 million
Ecu ($168 million).3 10 The Commission apparently credits equal weight
to market share and turnover.3 1 1 The Commission states, however, that
its quantitative definition of "appreciable" is not absolute, for agree-
302. Id. art. 223(1)(b).
303. Id. art. 232(1). There are analogous articles addressing the matter of compe-
tition under the ECSC Treaty. See E.C.S.C. TREATY art. 65 & art. 66.
304. See EEC TREATY arts. 3, 4, 5, 74-84.
305. Case 22/71, B6guelin Import Co. v. SA GL Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 949
(French text), [1972] 2 C.M.L.R. 81, 95.
306. See, e.g., Case 5/69, Franz V61k v. Etablissements J. Vervaeke, 1969 E.C.R.
295, 1969 C.M.L.R. 273 (0.2% - 0.5% market share in Germany not caught by Article
85(1), due to insignificant effect and weak position in the market); Case 258/78, L.C.
Nungesser KG v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278 (to fall
within ambit of Article 85(1) clause must show appreciable restrictions on competi-
tion and appreciable effect on trade); Joined Cases 19 & 20/74, Kali und Salz AG v.
Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 499, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 528 (2.5% of potash market does
not have noticeable effect).
307. Notice of 3 Sept. 1986 on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1986 OJ. (C
231) 2 [hereinafter Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance].
308. See, e.g., Case 75/84, Metro-SB-Grossmirkte Gmbh v. Commission, 1986
E.C.R. 3021, 3094-95, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 118, 167; Case 319/82, Soci6t6 de Vente de
Ciments et Betons de l'Est SA v. Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH, 1983 E.C.R. 4173, [1985]
1 C.M.L.R. 511. See also Commission Decision 90/22 of 20 December 1989 Relating
to a Proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (TEKO), 1990 O.J (L 13) 34;
Commission Decision 80/1074 of 16 October 1980 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (Industrieverband Solnhofener Natursteinplatten eV),
1980 O.J. (L 318) 32.
309. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 307, at 2.
310. Id. at 2-3.
311. GLEIss, supra note 75, at 92.
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ments between larger undertakings may have only negligible effect
within the Common Market.3 12 Thus the determination of whether an
agreement is of minor importance is made on a case-by-case basis. Situ-
ations in which the de minimis exception will apply to a market-dominant
firm are rare, however, because an undertaking with less than 5 percent
of the market will almost never hold a dominant position.
3. Notification and Application to the EC Commission
Regulation 17 requires a firm doing business in the EC to make a formal
application to the Commission whenever it seeks negative clearance for a
proposed agreement under Article 85(1) or 86,313 or to make a formal
notification when the firm desires an individual exemption under Article
85(3).314 Although there are no sanctions for not notifying an agree-
ment, an undertaking will shield itself from fines, should certain clauses
be found unlawful, from the date of notification through the date of the
Commission Decision granting or denying exemption.3 15 (There is,
however, no comparable immunization from fines upon application for
negative clearance.) Additionally, an important advantage to notifica-
tion is that an individual exemption may be granted retroactively to a
date no earlier than the date of notification. 3 16
The Court of Justice has made it clear that use of the official Form
A/B is mandatory, 3 17 and providing all information is a prerequisite to a
valid notification.3 1 8 Furthermore, the Commission has refused to give
effect to notifications that inaccurately report an agreement and has
assessed fines accordingly.3 19 Regulation 17 exempts certain agree-
ments, however, from the notification requirement. Specifically
exempted are agreements made by parties from a single Member State
312. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, supra note 307, at 2. The Com-
mission may impose fines should the undertakings negligently miscalculate their
aggregate market share or turnover. Id.
313. Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 2.
314. Id. art. 4(1).
315. Id. art. 15(5).
316. Id. art. 6(1).
317. See Form A/B, [1986-1991 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2659
(1985).
318. Joined Cases 209-215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck S.a.r.l. v. Commis-
sion, 1980 E.C.R. 3125, 3243, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 134, 220. See also Cases 240-242/
82, 261-62/82 & 268-269/82, Sigarettenindustrie v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 3831,
[1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 661; Case 56/65, Socit6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau
Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 1966 C.M.L.R. 357 (prohibition of fines under Reg.
17, art. 15(1)(a), applicable only to agreements notified in fact); Case 30/78, Distill-
ers Co., Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2229, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 121 (agreement
may receive individual exemption only with notification, even if the text of the agree-
ment has been otherwise communicated to the Commission).
319. See, e.g., Commission Decision 82/267 of 6 January 1982 Relating to a Pro-
ceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (AEG-Telefunken), 1982 O.J. (L 117) 15;
Commission Decision 90/645 of 28 November 1990 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (Bayer Dental), 1990 O.J. (L 351) 46 (individual exemp-
tion could not be granted when general conditions of sale and delivery were not
notified to the Commission).
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and involving no imports or exports between Member States,3 20 certain
two-party agreements regarding resale prices,3 2 ' and certain agree-
ments whose "sole object" is the development of standards and types of
joint R&D3 2 2 or specialization in the manufacture of products.3 2 3
4. Negative Clearance
Under Regulation 17, any enterprise that anticipates effecting an agree-
ment in the European Community may both notify it to the Commission
and seek "negative clearance,"'3 24 a procedure resulting in an official
statement that an undertaking need not apply for exemption because
Article 85(1) does not apply to its agreement, decision, or concerted
practice. The Commission rarely issues negative clearance when, in its
opinion, there is no reasonable expectation that an agreement will vio-
late Article 85(1).325
A firm should consider applying for negative clearance whenever an
agreement potentially infringes either Article 85 or 86.326 Even though
there is no possibility of obtaining exemption from the restrictions of
Article 86, a favorable response from the Commission will yield a formal
Decision that the agreement provides no ground for an Article 86 action
before a national court or upon a competitor's application to the
Commission.
The negative-clearance procedure has disadvantages, however.
First, as the Advocate General conceded in Tetra Pak, a national court,
while protecting individual rights directly conferred by the Treaty, may
not be bound by a Commission Decision granting negative clearance.3 27
The Court of First Instance has also questioned the legal import of neg-
ative clearance in national courts.3 28 Thus, negative clearance may not
deter a competitor from bringing an action under Article 85 or 86 in a
national court.
Because a national court remains competent to apply Articles 85(1)
and 86 only until the Commission has initiated a negative clearance pro-
cedure,3 29 it may be advantageous for a firm contemplating doing busi-
ness in the EC to seek both individual exemption and negative
clearance.3 30 Then a municipal tribunal will be required to adjourn a
320. Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 4(2)(1).
321. Id. art. 4(2)(2)(a).
322. Id. art. 4(3)(a)-(b).
323. Id. art. 4(3)(c).
324. Id. art. 2.
325. KERSE, supra note 197, at 357.
326. See Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 2.
327. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 375-76 (A.G. Opinion).
328. Id.
329. "As long as the Commission has not initiated a procedure under [Regulation
17, art. 2, for negative clearance upon application by an undertaking], the authorities
of the Member States shall remain competent to apply Article 85(1) and Article
86 .... Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 9(3).
330. Robin Whaite, Licensing in Europe, 3 E.I.P.R. 88 (1990).
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competition case, at least until such time as the Commission decides
whether to grant a negative clearance.
Second, the Commission is not required to verify a firm's compli-
ance with Article 86, and usually it will grant negative clearance only in
"clear cases." 3 3 1 Moreover, negative clearance will not prevent the
imposition of a fine for infringement in the time period between applica-
tion and denial of negative clearance. Thus, if possible, a firm should
apply for an individual exemption at the same time in order to shield
itself from fines.33 2
5. Compliance with Block Exemption
Conceivably, an undertaking may hope to comply with the requirements
of a block-exemption regulation, tailoring its agreement to the "white
list" of allowable clauses. In practice, however, agreements rarely qual-
ify fully and unquestionably for a given block exemption.3 33 Therefore,
a national court may still question the degree of compliance with the white
list 3 34 even though block-exemption regulations bind authorities in
Member States.3 35 Consequently, in spite of its efforts to comply, a firm
may find itself defending its qualification for block exemption in a
national court.
Since block exemptions derive from a "general, abstract assessment
... ex ante,"3 3 6 Judge Kirschner reasoned in his Tetra Pak Opinion that
"the effect of block exemption is weaker than that of individual exemp-
tion" because the Commission does not investigate an agreement to
measure it against the conditions of Article 85(3). 33 7 He thus cautioned
that block exemption is not equivalent to "tacit negative clearance. '3 38
Tetra Pak confirmed, furthermore, that block exemption will never pre-
vent a municipal court from assessing an allegation of abuse of domi-
nant position under Article 86.339
Conversely, Judge Kirschner indicated that block exemption is
"stronger" than individual exemption, which is not subject to "retroac-
tive withdrawal." "Block exemption is based directly on legislation and
not, as in the case of an individual exemption, on an administrative deci-
sion" by the Commission.3 40
The major advantage of a block exemption for a firm doing business
in the EC is the avoidance of costly application and notification proce-
331. A. Paul Victor et al., Common Market Competition Law: Current Practical Problems
in Distribution, 54 AmraausT L.J. 643, 652 (1985).
332. See 2 HAWK, supra note 52, at 2 n.3.
333. Whaite, supra note 330, at 88. "The first decision is whether to modify the
commercial proposals to fit the straitjacket." Id.
334. KERSE, supra note 197, at 68.
335. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 376 (A.G. Opinion).
336. Id. at 353.
337. Id. at 356.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 376.
340. Id. at 356-57.
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dures. The Director General of DG IV has stated that the "sheer mass
of agreements notified to us for exemption and chronic staff shortages"
have resulted in a state of affairs in which individual exemptions can no
longer provide legal certainty.3 4 1 As a result, a firm will profit from
using a block exemption to avoid the bureaucratic delays accompanying
either negative clearance or individual exemption.
The disadvantages of block exemptions include the restriction that
an agreement must be between two parties and not more,3 4 2 and the
Commission's power to withdraw exemption whenever it determines
that the effects of a transaction fail to meet the conditions set down in
Article 85(3).34 3 Furthermore, Tetra Pak confirms that a block exemp-
tion will not shield a powerful firm's agreement should the Commission
detect any abuse of dominant position.
Finally, as a result of lobbying and other political exigencies of the
Member States, the particular components enunciated by block-exemp-
tion regulations tend to reflect only the most common and typical
clauses across the entire spectrum of all types of businesses in all Euro-
pean States.3 4 4 Consequently, the clauses appearing on a regulation
white list may simply not fit a firm's business needs, and if an unap-
proved provision is necessary for a contract, an enterprise will need to
take further actions to protect itself either by means of individual
exemption or negative clearance.
6. "Opposition Procedure" -Accelerated Exemption
A hybrid form of exemption, known as the "opposition procedure," has
been created through provisions within certain block-exemption regula-
tions, including the Patent-Licensing Exemption.3 4 5 DG IV initiated the
341. Manfred Caspari, EEC Enforcement Policy and Practice: An Official View, 54 ANTI-
TRUST LJ. 599, 601 (1985). The Director General reported in 1985, for example,
that the adoption in 1967 of a regulation governing exclusive-distribution block
exemption alone had cleared a backlog of 31,000 notified agreements, and the Exclu-
sive Purchasing Block Exemption "should clarify the status" of 100,000 agreements.
Id. at 604.
More recent figures show a substantial backlog of competition cases. In 1988 the
Commission issued only twenty-five formal Decisions, including one rejection of a
complaint, ten individual exemptions, one negative clearance, seven "prohibitions"
under Article 85 and six more under Article 86. During the same year 36 comfort
letters were issued and 419 cases were settled without formal letters. EIGHTEENTH
REPORT, supra note 299, at 45. Further, in 1988 firms submitted 376 new applications
and notifications, adding to a sum of 2909 outstanding applications and notifications.
Altogether 3451 cases were pending before the Commission at the close of 1988. Id.
at 46.
342. See, e.g., Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, art. 1.
343. See id. art. 9.
344. Victor, supra note 331, at 645.
345. The Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, was the first to provide
for the "opposition procedure." The procedure has been incorporated into more
recent block exemptions, including R&D Block Exemption, supra note 17; Specializa-
tion Block Exemption, supra note 15; Know-how-Licensing Block Exemption, supra
note 12; Franchising Block Exemption, supra note 13. There are analogous proce-
dures in the Maritime Transport Regulation, supra note 16.
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procedure in order to expedite individual exemptions and negative
clearances.3 46 The Commission also hopes the procedure will offer EC
firms greater legal certainty, and John E. Ferry, a director of DG IV,
describes it as a "mechanism ... for a potentially quick decision on bor-
derline cases." '3 4 7
Procedurally, an undertaking wishing to enter an agreement con-
taining clauses restrictive of competition-but appearing neither on the
black list nor the white list-must notify the Commission. If within six
months the Commission has voiced no opposition, the provision
becomes exempt by default.3 48 Such exemption is probably valid at
least until the block-exemption regulation expires.3 49
If, on the other hand, the Commission asserts its opposition within
the six-month period,35 0 the agreement becomes subject to Regulation
17, and the notifying party may apply for formal negative clearance.3 5 1
The Commission may withdraw its opposition at any time unless a Mem-
ber State intervenes.3 5 2 Should an undertaking persuade the Commis-
sion that its agreement complies with the conditions of Article 85(3), its
exemption will be retroactively effective from the date of its first
notification. 353
If the Commission fails to respond to a notification, third parties
will not be notified, and the Commission's non-action may be neither
binding on third parties nor enforceable in national courts.3 54 Unfortu-
nately, parties will remain in doubt as to whether an agreement could
indeed achieve exemption, and, once again, the question may be
346. VALENTINE KORAH, PATENT LiCENSING AND EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULA-
TION 2349/84, 95 (1985) [hereinafter PATENT LICENSING].
347. John E. Ferry, Joint Research and Development and Other Joint Ventures, 54 Air-
TRUST L.J. 677, 679 (1985).
348. See Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, art. 4(1); R&D Block
Exemption, supra note 17, art. 7(1); Specialization Block Exemption, supra note 15,
art. 4(1); Know-how-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 12, art. 4(1); Franchising
Block Exemption, supra note 13, art. 6(1). There are analogous procedures in the
Maritime Transport Regulation, supra note 16, art. 12(1-3).
349. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING, supra note 346, at 95. Typically, a block exemp-
tion lasts 10 years. The present Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, for example,
expires on Dec. 31, 1994.
350. See Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, art. 4(5); R&D Block
Exemption, supra note 17, art. 7; Specialization Block Exemption, supra note 15, art.
4(l)-(2); Know-how-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 12, art. 4; Franchising
Block Exemption, supra note 13, art. 6. See also Maritime Transport Regulation, supra
note 16, art. 12(3).
351. See Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 2.
352. See Patent-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 4, art. 4(6); R&D Block
Exemption, supra note 17, art. 7(6); Specialization Block Exemption, supra note 15,
art. 4(6); Know-how-Licensing Block Exemption, supra note 12, art. 4(7); Franchising
Block Exemption, supra note 13, art. 6(6).
353. KERSE, supra note 197, at 69.
354. James S. Venit, The Commission's Opposition Procedure - Between the Scylla of Ultra
Vires and the Charybdis of Perfume: Legal Consequences and Tactical Considerations, 22 CoM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 167, 173 (1985).
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resolved ultimately in a national court.3 5 5  Moreover, so long as the
notified agreement floats in limbo between notification and exemption
(or non-opposition), it may remain unenforceable in court and subject
to automatic nullification under Article 85(2).356
A notification under the opposition procedure, devised as it is
under the aegis of a block-exemption regulation, does not terminate the
competence of national courts, unlike a notification for negative clear-
ance pursuant to Regulation 17, article 9(3), which does. Further, such
non-opposition from the Commission would not likely be appealable to
the Court of First Instance,3 5 7 because the ECJ has held that only a mea-
sure "definitively laying down the position of the Commission or the
Council" is an act appealable to the Court of Justice.3 58
An undertaking may use the opposition procedure when no part of
an agreement is on the black list of the pertinent block exemption, and it
should do so when there are nevertheless clauses that do not appear on
the white list of unquestionably valid clauses. A favorable response
from the Commission, that is, no opposition to an agreement within the
six-month limit, will enable the firm to avoid the tedious route of indi-
vidual exemption or negative clearance, as well as the need to rewrite its
contract to conform with the exact contours of the block exemption. In
other words, the firm may rely on its grey clauses as having been
deemed exempt. At the very least, any fines levied by the Commission
will not apply from the date of notification.3 5 9
A drawback to the opposition procedure is that block exemptions
may include ceilings limiting the size or annual turnover of the firm and
its trading partner.3 60 This may be one reason why, in practice, under-
takings have not used the opposition procedure frequently.3 61 One
practitioner contends, furthermore, that firms fear "an early and over-
cautious" decision regarding exemption and hope that "an ordinary
notification will gather dust in a corner for the effective life of the agree-
ment."'3 62 Finally, "[u]nimportant agreements may well slip through
the opposition procedure and save the parties from the need to distort
355. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING, supra note 346, at 98.
356. KERSE, supra note 197, at 73. "It is necessary therefore to ascertain whether
an agreement notified under the opposition procedure has the benefit of exemption
immediately but subject to the possibility of opposition, or at the end of the six-
month period and then with or without retrospective effect. The bloc [sic] exemption
regulations are silent on this except for the provision which says that where the oppo-
sition is withdrawn . . . the exemption applies from the date of notification." Id.
357. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING, supra note 346, at 99-100.
358. See Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639, 2652, [1981] 3
C.M.L.R. 635, 659.
359. See Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 15(5).
360. See R&D Block Exemption, supra note 17, art. 3(3), which disqualifies under-
takings with a market share in excess of 20%. See also Specialization Block Exemp-
tion, supra note 15, art. 3(l), which mandates ceilings of 20% market share and
annual turnover of 500 million Ecu. Id. See supra note 200.
361. Whaite, supra note 330, at 88.
362. Id.
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their agreements to bring them within the ambit" of the block
exemption.3 6 3
Despite its shortcomings, the opposition procedure is expected to
become standard in EC competition law, 364 and it may provide a useful
middle ground between block exemption and individual exemption.
7. Formal Individual Exemption
As provided in Article 85(3), an agreement that restricts or distorts com-
petition in violation of Article 85(1) is eligible for individual exemption
if it stays within the contours of Article 85(3)(a) and (b), that is, "con-
tributes to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods
or to the promotion of technical or economic progress while reserving
to users an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom." 365 Unlike
the Commission's categorical exemptions, which tender an automatic
exemption and require no communication with the Commission, indi-
vidual exemptions are granted only when an undertaking notifies its
agreement to the Commission.3 66
The Advocate General confirmed in Tetra Pak that, once DG IV has
granted an individual exemption, an agreement is no longer susceptible
to allegations of infringement of Article 85(1) in municipal courts
because national authorities "may not circumvent the erga omnes effect of
the decision."3 67 Consequently, individual exemption may afford an
undertaking relative security that its agreement is legal. Moreover, a
dominant firm need not fear that its agreement will later be deemed
"abusive" because, once the agreement is notified, the Commission will
have studied it for infringements of both Article 85 and 86. Most likely,
a large firm will need to use the individual exemption procedure if (a) its
market share and turnover exceed the ceilings provided by a block-
exemption opposition procedure, or (b) it cannot conform its agreement
to the legal limits of the block-exemption regulation.
On the negative side, "individual exemption.., can involve, in the
words of the Commission itself, 'considerable bother and expense.'
Some [practitioners in the EC] may regard this as something of an
understatement. 3 6 8 The Commission can grant only a small number of
individual exemptions each year, and, according to the Director General
of DG IV, "[piriority is given in selecting the cases to bring forward for
decision to those which are of real importance for the European
Community."3 6 9
Experience shows that the Commission tends to measure agree-
ments that have been notified for individual exemption against the
363. KORAH, PATENT LICENSING, supra note 346, at 95-96.
364. Venit, supra note 354, at 168.
365. EEC TREATY art. 85(3)(a) & (b).
366. Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 4(1).
367. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 376 (A.G. Opinion).
368. Victor, supra note 331, at 646.
369. Caspari, supra note 341, at 603.
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model clauses in black and white lists of block exemptions. 370 Thus, an
agreement under consideration for approval may be rejected by the
Commission if it appears on the black list even though the rationale for
blacklisting a contract provision is not applicable. 37' If future decisions
run on this tack, the specific examples listed in block-exemption regula-
tions could offer a standard for all exemptions, making case-by-case con-
sideration of agreements unnecessary.
8. Administrative Letters ("Comfort Letters")
Another possible outcome of an exchange with DG IV is that it will sim-
ply close an undertaking's file, granting neither formal exemption nor
negative clearance. A large percentage of cases before the Commission
are resolved not by formal Decision but by informal resolution, such as a
voluntary withdrawal of an application or a voluntary relinquishment of
an agreement that has raised the hackles of the Commission. 72 Often
in these cases, the authorities will state in an administrative letter, com-
monly called a "comfort letter," that the Commission is not moved to
issue a Statement of Objections or initiate any proceedings. 373
Although comfort letters are not legally binding on municipal
courts,3 74 a comfort letter may nevertheless advance a party's cause
before a national tribunal, which is likely to find the Commission's con-
clusion persuasive. 375 Paradoxically, this may present a difficulty: a let-
ter from the Commission stating that an agreement should qualify for
exemption will imply that the clause in question infringes Article 85(1).376
Thus, the undertaking may inadvertently find itself in the unpleasant sit-
uation of receiving the Commission's opinion that an agreement
infringes the Treaty without receiving any valid exemption.
370. Victor, supra note 331, at 645-46.
371. See Valentine Korah, The Velcro/Aplix Decision: Is There Sufficient Market Analysis
in Individual Decisions After the Group Exemption?, 10 E.I.P.R. 296, 300 (1985). See also
Commission Decision 85/410 of 12July 1985 Relating to a Proceeding under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (Velcro/Aplix), 1985 O.J. (L 233) 22.
372. 2 HAWK, supra note 52, at 19.
373. Venit, supra note 354, at 170. This may also be referred to as "light" negative
clearance. See id. at 169.
374. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 375-76 (A.G. Opinion). See also Socit6
Tecnisom France v. Serap Ameublement S.a.r.l., 1990 E.C.R. 238 (Court d'Appel
Paris, 1989) (comfort letter from EC Commission not binding on national court);
Case 31/80, NV L'Oreal v. PVBA de Nieuwe AMCK, 1980 E.C.R. 3775, [1981] 2
C.M.L.R. 235 (administrative letter from official of the Commission may not be relied
upon by third parties and is not binding on national court);Joined Cases 253/78 & 1-
3/79, Procureur de la Republique v. Bruno Giry, 1980 E.C.R. 2327, [1981] 2
C.M.L.R. 99 (comfort letters not binding on the Commission); Case 37/79, Anne
Marty SA v. Estee Lauder SA, 1980 E.C.R. 2481, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 43 (administra-
tive letter not binding on third parties even when a file is closed by the Commission).
375. See Case 99/79, SA Lancome v. Etos BV, 1980 E.C.R. 2511, 2536, [1981] 2
C.M.L.R. 164 (comfort letter not binding on national courts but may constitute a
factor which courts may take into account). See also VALEN'TINE KORAH, FRANCHISING
AND THE EEC CoMPETITIoN RULES: REGULATION 4087/88, 6 (1989) [hereinafter
FRANCHISING].
376. KORAH, FRANCHISING, supra note 375, at 6.
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Originally, comfort letters were aimed only at applications for nega-
tive clearance, but since 1983 they have been used in order to "open the
way for a more flexible administrative practice in assessing notifications"
for individual exemption.3 77 By demanding that the Commission "pub-
lish a summary of the relevant application or notification and invite all
interested third parties to submit their observations"378 before making a
decision regarding Article 85(3) exemption, Regulation 17 has given
rise to a more formal type of comfort letter. Firms doing business in the
EC may increasingly rely on comfort letters in light of Commission
efforts to provide undertakings with a growing measure of legal cer-
tainty.379 After such publication, the Commission may simply close an
undertaking's file.
This more formal approach is less commonly used than the infor-
mal letter.380 Now the Commission may publish in the Official Journal
of the Community its determination that an agreement caught by Article
85(1) should nevertheless be exempted, inviting comments by inter-
ested parties. 38' Along with details of the notified agreement, the Com-
mission may announce its intention to close its file on the matter. The
purpose of this publication is to enhance the value of the comfort letter
without giving up the Commission's power to intervene to void an
agreement by means of Decision.
Although formal letters do not constitute formal individual exemp-
tions, they may carry some weight in a later court action, especially when
a party opponent raised no prior objection to the exemption when it was
published in the Official Journal.38 2 Despite the enhanced status of
comfort letters within the Community, these administrative letters do
not enjoy the status of a Commission Decision, and they are not appeal-
able to the Court of First Instance.
Conclusion
Tetra Pak is a landmark case not because the judgment was surprising
but because it filled a gap in EC law. The European Court's full consid-
eration focused on the single question, "whether Article 86 can be
applied where exemption has been granted under Article 85(3)."383
Relying on past judgments of the Court ofJustice, the Advocate General
convincingly demonstrated that Articles 85 and 86 are concurrently
applicable. 384 Nevertheless, Tetra Pak's application to the Court to
377. Notice From the Commission on Procedures Concerning Notifications Pursu-
ant to Article 4 of Council Regulation 17/62 (Notice of the Commission), O.J. (C
295) 6.
378. Regulation 17, supra note 34, art. 19(3).
379. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TWELFrH REPORT ON COMPErrTON POLICY 37
(1983).
380. Whaite, supra note 330, at 88.
381. Venit, supra note 354, at 170.
382. Whaite, supra note 330, at 89.
383. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 380.
384. Id. at 346-47 (A.G. Opinion).
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overturn the Commission's interdiction of the exclusive patent license
agreement was not frivolous, for the issue had not previously been
expressly determined by EC Courts.3 8 5
Tetra Pak provided the Advocate General the opportunity to
expound on the legal similarities of block-exemption regulations,3 8 6
which, with DG IV's increasing experience gathered from a growing
backlog of notifications, will likely generate future categorical exemp-
tions. As a result, it is clear that the Court has not confined the Tetra Pak
ruling to the area of patent licensing, and that the decision will apply to
any and all block exemptions promulgated by the Commission. 38 7 In
short, block exemption protection will not shield agreements that facili-
tate abuse of dominant position in the Common Market.
Even a firm with considerable market power may rely upon the
"positive side" of EC competition law, however, making use of the dero-
gations allowed from the commands of the competition Articles of the
Treaty of Rome. When an agreement, decision, or concerted practice
potentially violates Article 85(1), a firm may take advantage of negative
clearance 38 8 or individual exemption 38 9 as provided for in Regulation
17,390 or it may seek a "comfort letter" from the Commission.3 9 1 If a
contract falls within the subject matter of a block exemption, a firm can
try to match its agreement to the white list of the block-exemption regu-
lation,3 9 2 or, alternatively, it may seek approval of its grey clauses
through the opposition procedure.3 93
When a firm's activity may infringe Article 86, negative clearance
and comfort letters may afford some protection,3 9 4 but the Commission
expects market-dominant firms to conduct their business without dis-
torting competition.3 9 5 This recondite duty to avoid distortion of competi-
tion, along with the somewhat obscure "objective" test for abuse, may
frustrate large firms that seek to avoid the scrutiny of the Commission.
Further, as Tetra Pak shows, a firm may back into an infringement of
Article 86 without being fully aware of it.3 96 The responsibility to com-
port with EC admonitions against "abusive" behavior is amplified in the
wake of Tetra Pak: since the Court fears the destruction of the uniform
application of the competition-law Articles of the Treaty "by drawing
artificial distinctions"3 9 7 among the block exemptions, an abusive
385. Id. at 383.
386. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 289-95 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 324-32 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 365-71 and accompanying text.
390. See Regulation 17, supra note 34, arts. 2, 4.
391. See supra notes 372-82 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 333-44 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 345-64 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 324-32, 372-79 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
397. Tetra Pak, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 355-56 (A.G. Opinion).
Vol. 25
1992 E.E.C. Competition Law
arrangement can lead to the immediate loss of all applicable block
exemption protections.
Moreover, the Court has conceded that "the other party to the
agreement with the undertaking in the dominant position does not nec-
essarily know about its dominance of the market and hence about the
possible application of Article 86."398 In other words, the dominant
firm's trading partner may be surprised-as was BTG-to find a mutu-
ally satisfactory agreement nullified by the EC Commission. Further, EC
authorities will not hesitate to exercise their jurisdiction over non-EC
firms whenever the effects of an agreement are felt within the Common
Market.3 9 9
Finally, Tetra Pak indicates that certain anticompetitive agreements
countenanced by the Commission on account of their beneficial effects
within the EC4 0 0 may be constrained whenever they abrade the princi-
ples and purposes of the Treaty.4 0 ' Even agreements sanctioned by
national intellectual property laws may not survive when they breach
Article 3()'s absolute demand that an undertaking shall not distort com-
petition within the Common Market.40 2 Tetra Pak thus also stands for
the proposition that the tensions between legal but private monopolies
and Community law will be resolved in favor of the precepts of the
Treaty of Rome. Even an agreement sanctioned as promotive of techni-
cal progress and the commonweal will founder when it distorts competi-
tion within the European Community.
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